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As more states consider marriage recognition for same-sex
couples, attention turns to the conflict between marriage equality and
religious liberty. Legal scholars are contributing substantially to the
debate, generating a robust academic literature and writing directly
to state lawmakers urging them to include a "marriage conscience
protection" containing a series of religious exemptions in marriage
equality legislation. Yet the intense scrutiny of religious freedom
specifically in the context of same-sex marriage obscures the root of
the conflict. At stake is the central role of relationships in expressing
one's sexual orientation; same-sex relationships constitute lesbian
and gay identity, and religious objections arise largely in response to
such relationships. Marriage is merely one form of sexual orientation
identity enactment, and religious objections to same-sex marriage
are merely a subset of objections to sexual orientation equality.
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This Article argues for an antidiscrimination regime that
protects same-sex relationships under the rubric of sexual
orientation, and it resists the use of marriage equality legislation as a
vehicle for undermining current sexual orientation-based
nondiscrimination provisions. Even as the "marriage conscience
protection "proposed by religious liberty scholars misapprehends the
basis of the underlying conflict-that same-sex relationships are an
expression of identity and that religious objections largely relate to
that identity-its sweeping language threatens to undermine
antidiscrimination protections and target lesbians and gay men based
not primarily on their marriages but instead more generally on their
same-sex relationships. It does so at a moment when
antidiscrimination law is increasingly acknowledging the relational
component of sexual orientation such that impermissible
discrimination based on sexual orientation includes discrimination
against same-sex relationships. By permitting religious
organizations, as well as some employers, property owners, and
small businesses, to discriminate against same-sex couples in
situations far removed from marriage itself the "marriage
conscience protection " would threaten substantial progress made in
antidiscrimination law. Worse yet, using the term "marriage
conscience protection" to label instances of discrimination against
same-sex relationships would hide an increasing amount of sexual
orientation discrimination that antidiscrimination law is just
beginning to adequately address.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to the Washington, D.C., Council opening marriage to same-
sex couples, Catholic Charities announced that it would no longer offer health
insurance coverage to spouses of employees.1 The organization framed the
decision as the only way to reconcile Catholic doctrine with the new law.
Catholic Charities took this position despite the fact that Washington, D.C.,
already had a sexual orientation antidiscrimination law and domestic
partnership recognition. 2 To Catholic Charities, marriage for same-sex couples
posed a new set of issues that sexual orientation nondiscrimination mandates
and domestic partnership did not.
In New York, the fate of marriage equality legislation in the state senate
appeared to hinge on the prospect of religious exemptions. Catholic advocates
argued that the new law would force the Church to accommodate marriages to
which it objects.3 Senator Greg Ball and other lawmakers pressured Governor
Andrew Cuomo to ensure that the final bill had robust protections for religious
objectors.4 The legislation ultimately included language that immunized
religious institutions from suit and linked the legal fate of the religious
accommodations to the fate of the entire marriage law.5 The New York Times
reported that the religious exemptions that ultimately emerged in the legislation
were key to its passage. 6
The events in Washington, D.C., and New York are not unusual. Around
the country, Christian Right7 advocates are focusing on the harms that same-sex
1. See William Wan, Catholic Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses; Same-Sex
Marriage in District Drives Change in Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at Al. Catholic Charities
grandfathered in (different-sex) spouses already insured through the organization.
2. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2006); D.C. CODE § 32-702 (2006).
3. See Kenneth Lovett, Gay Marriage Bill Dead Without Church Exemptions, Says State Sen.
Greg Ball, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 6, 2011, at 6.
4. See id; see also Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Cuomo Is Urged to Alter Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A28.
5. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b (McKinney 2012).
6. See Danny Hakim, Exemptions Were Key to Vote on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2011, at A20.
7. The Christian Right movement in this context includes organizations and individuals
representing evangelical Protestants, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS), and the
Catholic Church. For an exploration of the Christian Right movement and its legal activism, see
Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on
Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 303, 322-27 (2009). For an insightful analysis
of the argumentation by the LDS Church in the same-sex marriage context, see Kaimipono Wenger,
The Church's Use of Secular Arguments, 42 DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT 105 (2009). It is
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marriage 8 will inflict on religious objectors. 9 The National Organization for
Marriage, a social conservative advocacy group, warns that marriage for same-
sex couples will lead to significant encroachments on religious liberty in
domains as diverse as schools, businesses, hospitals, and houses of worship.
10
Meanwhile, many gay rights advocates recognize the salience of religious
freedom issues in the marriage equality context." They endorse limited
religious accommodations in marriage legislation at the same time that they
hail marriage for same-sex couples as a monumental step toward lesbian and
gay equality.'
2
These issues are not playing out simply in the realm of advocacy. Legal
scholars are contributing directly to legislative debates and producing a
substantial academic literature on the topic.' 3 Religious liberty scholars, rather
important to note that one can find a variety of positions on sexual orientation nondiscrimination and
marriage equality in religious communities.
8. Although I prefer the terms "marriage for same-sex couples" and "marriage equality," I
sometimes use the term "same-sex marriage" to track the language used by both scholars and
advocates addressing religious objections to marriage for same-sex couples.
9. For an insightful analysis of the strategy behind the Proposition 8 campaign in California,
see Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357 (2009).
10. NationForMarriage, National Organization for Marriage Gathering Storm TV Ad,,
YouTUBE(Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/user/NationForMarriage#p/u/99/Wp76ly2_Nol
(last visited June 16, 2012); Brian Montopoli, $1.5 Million Spent on Anti-gay Marriage Ad, CBS NEWS
(Apr. 8, 2009, 10:29 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4928505-503544.html (last
visited June 16, 2012); National Organization for Marriage, National Organization for Marriage
Launches $500,000 Ad Campaign in New York; Pledges $1 Million in 2012 Elections (May 10, 2011),
http://www.nationfonrmarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=omL2KeNOLzH&b-5075189&ct=
9458165 (last visited June 16, 2012).
11. 1 use the term "gay rights advocates" throughout this Article because the issue of marriage
equality is understood largely as a sexual orientation-based priority. Nonetheless, gay rights advocates
represent a broad constituency of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.
12. See discussion infra Part I. Nonetheless, some gay rights advocates have opposed attempts
to include more far-reaching religious exemptions in relationship-recognition laws. See Letter from
American Civil Liberties Union et al., to Lincoln Chafee, Governor of R.I. (June 28, 2011) (opposing
religious accommodations in Rhode Island's civil union bill), available at http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/page/-/files/pdfs/Chafee%201etter final.pdf.
13. See SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS L1BERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS I (Douglas
Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LtBERTY]; Thomas C.
Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC.
POL'Y 206 (2010); Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land- The Case
for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45
U.S.F. L. REV. 389 (2010); Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to
Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Marketplace, 5 Nw.
J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 236 (2010); Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay
Marriage Culture Wars, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 260 (2010); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-
Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 274 (2010); Roger Severino,
Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
939 (2007); Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 307
(2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 318 (2010) [hereinafter Wilson,
Insubstantial Burdens]; Fredric J. Bold, Jr., Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict
[Vol. 100: 11691172
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than sexual orientation scholars, have generated the bulk of this growing body
of work. 14 The recent scholarly turn toward the conflict between same-sex
marriage and religious freedom has been structured largely around proposals
made by a group of prominent religious liberty scholars, including Professors
Thomas Berg, Carl Esbeck, Richard Garnett, Douglas Laycock, and Robin
Fretwell Wilson. Their contributions have influenced not merely the academic
discourse but also the legislative trajectory of marriage equality. These
scholars, more recently joined by others,15 have written to state lawmakers to
Between Religious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
179 (2009); Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston: The Coming Conflict Between Same-Sex Marriage
and Religious Liberty, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20 [hereinafter Gallagher, Banned in
Boston].
14. But see Flynn, supra note 13; Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties,
in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 123. Professor Andrew
Koppelman has written extensively about both religious freedom and sexual orientation. See ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript on file
with author); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
LAW (2002).
15. Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.),
Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. &
Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Edward McGlynn Gaffhey, Jr., Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, Richard W.
Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., & Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-exec.
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong., to Sheldon Silver, N.Y. Assemblyman (May 8, 2009)
[hereinafter Berg et al., N.Y. Letter]; Letter from Andrew Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of
Law, Nw. Univ., Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich.,
Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ., & Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-
exec. Dir., Am. Jewish Cong., to John Lynch, Governor of N.H. (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter Laycock
et al., N.H. Letter], available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/newhampshireexemptions
lynch2.pdf; Letter from Andrew Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Nw. Univ.,
Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Michael Perry, Robert
W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ., & Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-exec. Dir., Am. Jewish
Cong., to David A. Paterson, Governor of N.Y. (May 8, 2009) [hereinafter Laycock et al., N.Y.
Letter], available at mirrorofiustice.blogs.comlfiles/newyorkexemptionspatersonl.doc; Letter from
Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory Univ., Douglas Laycock, Robert E.
Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Religious Studies, Univ. of Va., & Marc D.
Stem, Member, N.Y. Bar, to Lisa Brown, Senate Majority Leader, Wash. State Senate (Jan. 28, 2012)
[hereinafter Laycock et al., Wash. Letter], available at http://mirrorotustice.blogs.com/files/
washington20l2-me-too-brown.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Chair of 1958 Law Alumni
Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law
& Pub. Policy, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Mo., Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law School, & Marc D. Stem,
Member of the N.Y. Bar for Legal Advocacy, to Brian E. Frosh, Md. State Sen., Chairman (Jan. 30,
2012) [hereinafter Wilson et al., Md. Letter], available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/
maryland-letter- 1.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch.
of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H.
Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame
Law Sch., Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-exec. Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong., & Edward
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Paul A. Sarlo, Sen. of N.J.,
Senate Judiciary Comm. Chairman (Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Wilson et al., N.J. Letter], available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/12-4-2009-nj-sarlo-ssm-letter-l.pdf, Letter from Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Class of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C.
Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Pol'y, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl
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recommend the inclusion of a "marriage conscience protection" in marriage
legislation.' 6 The "marriage conscience protection" contains a series of
religious exemptions that purport to resolve the impending clashes between
marriage equality and religious freedom.' 7 As witnessed both by the course of
H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre
Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stem, Member of the N.Y. Bar for Legal Advocacy, & Edward McGlynn
Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law, to Dean G. Skelos, Senator of N.Y.
(May 17, 2011) [hereinafter Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter], available at http://www.nysun.com/files/law
professorsletter.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Chair of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law,
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Pol'y,
Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of
Law, Richard W. Garnett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stem, Member
of the N.Y. Bar for Legal Advocacy, & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso
Univ. Sch. of Law, to Rep. Jamie Pedersen, Wash. State Legislature, House Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 11,
2012) [hereinafter Wilson et al., Wash. Letter], available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
files/washington-followup-house-members-6239-es2.7.2012-1.pdf. They also sent letters to Iowa
lawmakers, but the publicly available versions do not list the recipients. See Letter from Andrew
Koppelman, John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Nw. Univ., Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar
Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., Michael Perry, Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law,
Emory Univ., & Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-exec. Dir., Am. Jewish Cong. (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter
Laycock et al., Iowa Letter], available at http://mirrorotustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/
memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-marriage.html; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St.
Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, Richard
W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., Marc D. Stem, Acting Co-exec.
Dir./Gen. Counsel, Am. Jewish Cong., & Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Professor of Law, Valparaiso
Univ. Sch. of Law (July 9, 2009) [hereinafter Wilson et al., Iowa Letter], available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/2009-07-12-iowa-letter-final.doc.
16. See Letter from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law
(Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law,
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, & Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law
Sch., to John Lynch, Governor of N.H. (May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al., N.H. Letter]; Letter
from Thomas C. Berg, St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minnesota), Carl H.
Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee
Univ. Sch. of Law, & Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to John
Baldacci, Governor of Me. (May 1, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al., Me. Letter], available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/sp-384-me-letter-to-govemor.pdf, Letter from Douglas Laycock,
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to John Baldacci, Governor of Maine (Apr.
30, 2009) [hereinafter Laycock, Me. Letter]; Letter from Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate
Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to Christopher G. Donovan, Speaker of the House, Conn. (Apr. 21,
2009) [hereinafter Laycock, Conn. Letter], available at http://www.nationformarriage.org/atf/cf/%
7B39D8B5C1-F9FE-48C0-ABE6-1029BA77854C%7D/Laycock.pdf, Letter from Thomas C. Berg,
St. Ives Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ.
of Mo., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, & Richard W.
Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., to Christopher G. Donovan, Speaker of the
House, Conn. (Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Berg et al., Conn. Letter].
17. The provision proposed during the Connecticut legislature's codification of marriage
equality is illustrative:
No individual and no religious corporation, entity, association, educational institution, or
society shall be penalized or denied benefits under the laws of this state or any subdivision
of this state, including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination,
housing, public accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or tax-exempt
status, for refusing to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges related to the solemnization of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any
1174 [Vol. 100: 1169
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the legislative debates and the resulting religious accommodations included in
marriage laws, religious liberty scholars are having a direct and substantial
impact on the issue.
All parties involved-lawmakers, Christian Right activists, religious
organizations, gay rights advocates, and legal scholars-seem to agree on one
thing: marriage presents a unique and highly significant issue that promises
equality for lesbians and gay men at the same time that it threatens the right of
religious organizations and individuals to discriminate.18 Despite this
consensus, the commentary generally misapprehends the root of the issue-
religious objections to the underlying sexual orientation-based identity claim.
The focus on religious exemptions in the marriage context fails to reflect
where issues actually arise-and will continue to arise-on the ground. Clashes
between sexual orientation equality and religious freedom prominently feature
same-sex relationships, rather than same-sex marriages. Religious objections
are based largely on the public, relational component of sexual orientation-the
fact that lesbians and gay men enact their sexual orientation through same-sex
relationships.19 It is this public, relational enactment of sexual orientation
identity-not the form of the enactment-that increasingly animates sexual
orientation discrimination based on religious views.20
marriage, or for refusing to treat as valid any marriage, where such providing, solemnizing,
or treating as valid would cause that individual or religious corporation, entity[,
association, educational institution, or society to violate their sincerely held religious
beliefs.
Berg et al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 7-8. The more recent version is lengthier and reflects some
revisions. See infra note 53.
18. This debate tends to make a monolith out of religion, casting religious believers as anti-gay
rights and erasing pro-gay religious groups and individuals.
19. I frequently use the terms "lesbian" and "gay" throughout this Article. I do this to track the
relevant scholarly literature, advocacy discourse, and public commentary. It is important to recognize,
however, that bisexuals may also enact their sexual orientation identity through same-sex relationships
and similarly suffer sexual orientation discrimination arising out of such relationships. I intend
bisexuals to be covered by the antidiscrimination norms I articulate, and I want to emphasize at the
outset that bisexuals, like lesbians and gay men, are vulnerable to the same perverse effects of the
religious exemptions analyzed in this Article.
20. Indeed, as both law and culture have increasingly recognized lesbian and gay equality,
discrimination against lesbians and gay men has shifted from per se rejection of homosexuality toward
rejection of lesbians and gay men as same-sex couples, including but not limited to married couples.
Mitt Romney's position is illustrative of an increasingly common conservative position-professed
opposition to anti-gay discrimination and simultaneous opposition to legal recognition for same-sex
couples. See Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, Lectern Gone, Romney Finds More Success, N.Y.
TimES, Oct. 25, 2011, at At (explaining Mitt Romney's position that he is "against discrimination"
against lesbians and gay men but "oppose[s] gay marriage and civil unions"). Indeed, Professor
Melissa Murray documents how the campaign for Proposition 8, which eliminated the right to marry
for same-sex couples in California, disaggregated arguments against marriage recognition from
arguments against homosexuality. See Murray, supra note 9, at 372-79 (explaining how in a campaign
ad, Proposition 8 proponents "attempt[] to distance opposition to same-sex marriage from bigotry and




In some ways, marriage is a logical location in which to resolve conflicts
between same-sex relationships and religious objections. Marriage is a public,
relational enactment of sexual orientation identity, and the expansion of
marriage equality to more states might very well mean that more conflicts
between same-sex couples and religious objectors arise. But despite its political
appeal, the focus on marriage obscures the centrality of the public, relational
component of sexual orientation for purposes of understanding both sexual
orientation equality and religious objections. Discrimination against married
same-sex couples, while based rhetorically on marriage, will at its core be
based on sexual orientation. Moreover, simply treating married same-sex
couples like married different-sex couples does not solve the problem of sexual
orientation discrimination. Rather, same-sex couples must be treated equally
across relationship contexts; their relationships, regardless of marital
designations, should be the center of the equality analysis. Only by including a
relationship-based understanding of sexual orientation identity in
antidiscrimination law-and then addressing religious exemptions in the
antidiscrimination domain-will we achieve a robust sexual orientation-based
antidiscrimination regime, in which same-sex couples and different-sex couples
are treated equally.
21
Accordingly, this Article challenges the framework that views marriage
equality as both the basis for relationship-based sexual orientation
nondiscrimination and the proper domain for religious exemptions from such
nondiscrimination norms. Put simply, I reject the use of marriage as
antidiscrimination law, both for lesbians and gay men and for religious
objectors.
While the focus on marriage obscures the centrality of same-sex
relationships, the "marriage conscience protection," which purports to
accommodate religious objections to same-sex marriage specifically, would in
practice burden lesbians and gay men based on their relationships more
generally. Through provisions authorizing religious objectors to refuse to "treat
as valid" any same-sex marriage and extending religious exemptions to secular,
commercial actors, the "protection" would reach far outside the marriage
context and permit discrimination against same-sex couples throughout the life
of their (marital) relationships. 22 The proposal would permit discrimination
21. Even for those opposed to sexual orientation equality or invested in religious objections
trumping sexual orientation equality, a more consistent and coherent resolution will derive from a
focus on antidiscrimination law, rather than marriage. In antidiscrimination law, religious objectors
might achieve exemptions that a resolution solely in marriage law would otherwise restrict. An
antidiscrimination exemption, for instance, might extend accommodation to situations involving same-
sex couples generally, rather than merely married or soon-to-be-married couples.
22. I sometimes include "marital" in parentheses to emphasize that the proposed religious
exemptions would impact same-sex relationships that happen to manifest themselves in a marital form.
In other words, the marital form of same-sex relationships is largely ancillary to both the
discrimination experienced by the couple and the basis for the religious exemptions.
[Vol. 100: 11691176
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that, in many cases, would be prohibited under the evolving framework of state
antidiscrimination law. As more couples have access to marriage and choose to
marry, more lesbians and gay men that had been protected by sexual orientation
antidiscrimination laws would come within the coverage of religious carve-outs
from marriage laws. Such carve-outs would allow religious organizations, as
well as in some cases employers, property owners, and small businesses, to
discriminate against married same-sex couples leading up to and throughout the
course of their marriages, in situations far removed from marriage itself. They
would do so at a moment when antidiscrimination law is beginning to protect
lesbians and gay men in their relationships, rather than simply as individuals.
Therefore, the religious exemptions may have significant unintended
consequences, unraveling antidiscrimination protections states have adopted in
a range of contexts unrelated to marriage and threatening progress toward an
antidiscrimination regime that accounts for same-sex relationships under the
rubric of sexual orientation.
Worse yet, using the label of "marriage conscience protection," rather
than sexual orientation discrimination, would shroud the actual occurrence, at
least as a legal matter, of such discrimination. Episodes of discrimination that
would otherwise be handled in antidiscrimination law, whether or not an
exemption existed, would instead hide behind the veil of marriage. In the end,
careful analysis of the proposed "marriage conscience protection" reveals that
the current debate implicates much more than marriage. At stake is a broader
vision of sexual orientation nondiscrimination.
23
23. In distancing lesbian and gay equality from marriage and identifying the dangers of
undertaking antidiscrimination work in the marriage context, this Article contributes to scholarship on
the limitations and constraints of marriage equality as the gay rights priority. But it does so from a
unique angle, drawing on a different substantive body of law and resisting a normative evaluation of
marriage as an institution. Scholars have criticized the gay rights movement's prioritization of
marriage to the extent that it limits the range of sexual and intimate relationships that can compete for
legitimacy. See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 1399, 1414 (2004) [hereinafter Franke, Domesticated Liberty] ("But it is wrong to understand the
fight for gay marriage as a fight for sexual freedom .... "); see also Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always
Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 229, 233 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley
eds., 2002); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICs OF
QUEER LIFE 96-98 (1999); Lisa Duggan, The Marriage Juggernaut, 21 GAY COMMUNITY NEWS 5, 5
(1996). In this view, a marriage-centered movement emphasizes lesbian and gay assimilation to
heterosexual norms, instead of appreciating nonnormative sexual practices that resonate with the
origins of the gay rights movement. See WARNER, supra, at 88-89, 113; see also Elizabeth M. Glazer,
Sodomy and Polygamy, Ill COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 66, 77 (2011), http://www.
columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/l 1l/66_Glazer.pdf; Melissa Murray, Marriage as
Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59-63 (2012). A related family law critique challenges marriage
as the privileged location for family-based rights and benefits, arguing that marriage equality produces
selective equality, delivering rights and benefits to lesbian and gay families that conform to entrenched
norms of coupling, monogamy, and nuclear-family parenting. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND
(STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 84 (2008) (arguing that marriage "is not a sensible approach toward
achieving just outcomes for the wide range of family structures in which LGBT people, as well as
many others, live"); see also Melissa Murray, What's So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 387,433 (2012); Duggan, supra, at 5; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Marriage Must
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides important background
by describing the current debate over religious liberty and marriage for same-
sex couples and setting out the evolving legal framework against which this
debate occurs. First, I show how the public debate and scholarly commentary
on marriage equality frames marriage as presenting a novel, unique set of
issues for religious freedom. Next, I focus on the "marriage conscience
protection" proposed by prominent religious liberty scholars in both academic
publications and letters to state lawmakers. While the "marriage conscience
protection" purports to provide religious exemptions in the specific context of
marriage, it threatens to alter more general antidiscrimination norms relating to
lesbians and gay men. Accordingly, the final section of Part I shows that the
"marriage conscience protection" intervenes against a framework of state
antidiscrimination law that includes protections based on sexual orientation in,
among other areas, public accommodations, employment, and housing. Of
course, marriage would usher in a sweeping change in lesbian and gay equality
and may in fact pose significant obstacles for organizations and individuals
with religious objections to sexual orientation nondiscrimination. Moreover, the
special status of marriage legally, religiously, and culturally accounts in part for
the way in which it is being singled out. Yet, as I argue, this special attention to
marriage has more rhetorical and political appeal than conceptual coherence.
The most significant stakes relate to antidiscrimination law, not marriage.
In Part II, I show how the current debate misidentifies same-sex marriage
as central to the conflict between sexual orientation nondiscrimination and
religious freedom when, in fact, same-sex relationships in general are at issue.
Lesbians and gay men enact their sexual orientation through same-sex
relationships, and same-sex relationships, rather than same-sex marriages, are
Not Eclipse Other Family Organizing, 21 GAY COMMUNITY NEWS 25, 25 (1996); Cathy Cohen, The
Price of Inclusion in the Marriage Club, 21 GAY COMMUNITY NEWS 27, 27 (1996); cf Vivian
Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 314 (2004). Yet
critics coming from both sexual freedom and family law perspectives are increasingly careful to
register their support for marriage equality. Eschewing justifications based on sexual liberty or family
policy, they instead voice their support in the language of civil rights and equality. See POLIKOFF,
supra, at 84 ("Advocating marriage for same-sex couples is a sensible way to champion equal civil
rights for gay men and lesbians."); Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2011, at A25 (describing same-sex marriage as a "historic civil rights victory"); Nancy D.
Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss
the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 573, 573 (2005) ("I urge supporters [of marriage for same-sex couples]
to base their ight-to-marry arguments on equality and, when considering the interests of children, to
advocate for the social and legal supports necessary for optimal child outcomes in all families.").
Nonetheless, their appeal to nondiscrimination principles should not be mistaken for an endorsement
of marriage as the key to lesbian and gay equality; such a move would run directly counter to their
compelling critiques. In recognizing both the strengths and weaknesses of viewing marriage through
an equality lens, these scholars find common ground with my intervention, which warns of the dangers
of working out sexual orientation equality in marriage rather than in antidiscrimination law. Moreover,
just as marriage equality will fail to do all of the important work of sexual liberation and family law
reform, I argue that it will also fail to do all of the work of antidiscrimination law and may in fact
produce outcomes that threaten gains made in the antidiscrimination domain
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at the core of the debate over marriage recognition and religious objections. In
fact, the cases cited by religious liberty scholars and advocates underscore the
breadth of the conflict and point to the relational component of sexual
orientation identity at stake. Indeed, the most prominent examples of conflicts
between same-sex couples and religious objectors implicate antidiscrimination
law's impact on same-sex relationships, regardless of marriage.
Understanding the way in which same-sex relationships enact and give
content to lesbian and gay identity suggests the importance of including
discrimination against same-sex relationships within sexual orientation
antidiscrimination law. Yet, as I show in Part III, antidiscrimination law
historically has approached sexual orientation in a static, individualistic way
that forecloses protection for the public, relational enactment of lesbian and gay
identity. Fortunately, however, there are key indications that antidiscrimination
law is moving toward greater coverage of same-sex relationships, due in part to
the marriage equality campaign. Nonetheless, we are yet to arrive at a robust
sexual orientation nondiscrimination norm that includes same-sex relationships.
To that end, I sketch the contours of an antidiscrimination regime that protects
same-sex relationships under the rubric of sexual orientation.
Finally, in Part IV, I show that while the religious exemptions proposed
by prominent religious liberty scholars purport to relate specifically to
marriage, they would in fact cut back on general sexual orientation
nondiscrimination principles and threaten progress made in antidiscrimination
law. These exemptions would permit discrimination against same-sex
relationships (and thereby permit sexual orientation discrimination otherwise
prohibited under state antidiscrimination law), but would do so under the
banner of marriage, thus obscuring the actual discrimination at stake. They
would authorize discrimination against same-sex relationships, throughout the
couples' married lives and in situations far removed from marriage, and yet
would channel such discrimination through religious accommodations relating
to marriage. In carving out same-sex relationships from sexual orientation
antidiscrimination law and doing so through marriage regulation, the proposed
religious exemptions would foreclose the promise of effective sexual
orientation nondiscrimination and, at the same time, obscure the lesbian and
gay identity claims and corresponding sexual orientation discrimination at
stake.
Let me be clear at the outset: I support limited exemptions for religious
objectors to sexual orientation nondiscrimination. My support is animated by a
normative commitment to religious freedom. I do not, however, support
exemptions that nominally relate to marriages of same-sex couples but
effectively deprive such couples of significant antidiscrimination protections
that should protect all same-sex relationships. Therefore, any such exemptions
should be in antidiscrimination, rather than marriage, law. I believe that the
religious liberty scholars proposing the "marriage conscience protection" are
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acting in good faith to protect those with sincere religious beliefs opposed to
sexual orientation equality. But I fear that their proposal would have
unintended consequences by providing many organizations and individuals a
broad license to discriminate against same-sex couples. In the end, I share
significant common ground with the scholars of whom I am critical. Indeed,
some of them have written explicitly about their support for both marriage
equality and religious liberty.24 But while these scholars are attempting to
balance the interests of same-sex couples and religious objectors specifically in
the marriage context, my analysis exposes both the breadth of the interests at
stake and the far-reaching implications of their attempt to strike a balance in
marriage law. Therefore, I argue that the consideration and resolution of the




A. The Current Discourse
Debates over marriage for same-sex couples increasingly focus on
religious liberty issues. As states legislate marriage recognition, scholars and
advocates urge lawmakers to codify religious accommodations for
25
organizations and individuals opposed to same-sex marriage.
The inclusion of religious interests specifically within discussions of
marriage equality makes sense for both gay rights proponents and Christian
Right detractors. For advocates and public officials sympathetic to gay rights, it
is politically expedient. 26 In New Hampshire, for instance, the inclusion of
religious exemptions allowed lawmakers, under threat of gubernatorial veto, to
codify marriage equality. Gay rights advocates were happy to sign on. As the
head of New Hampshire Freedom to Marry remarked, "It's a good compromise
that makes sense .... ,,
2 7
24. See Berg, supra note 13, at 207; Laycock et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 1.
25. Because of weakened constitutional protections for religious free exercise, legislative
solutions are the most viable in this setting. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 287-88.
26. Cf Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 781, 783 (2007) ("Avoiding direct confrontation between the government and religious groups
over antidiscrimination norms may also appeal to civil rights advocates who identify real risks of
severe backlash in the broader community.").
27. Kevin Landrigan, Religion Clause Is Added to Gay Marriage Proposal, NASHUA TEL.,
May 30, 2009, at At; see also Andrew Sullivan, The New Hampshire Formula, DAILY DISH (June 3,
2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2009/06/the-new-hampshire-formula/201003/
(last visited June 17, 2012) ("[T]he inclusion in a same-sex marriage bill of an explicit exception for
religious organizations seems to me to be a powerful combination, which both assures civil equality
and religious freedom, which seems to be the main fear of those who oppose equality."). Nonetheless,
gay rights advocates and sympathetic officials have resisted more sweeping religious exemptions. In
Rhode Island, leading movement advocates urged the Governor to reject the religious accommodations
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For advocates representing religious interests opposed to marriage
equality, the focus on accommodation in the context of marriage attempts to
address a potentially messy area of law and to propose remedies for situations
28that may very well arise on the ground. At the same time, depicting marriage
for same-sex couples as the central threat to religious freedom seizes on the
high-stakes, high-profile nature of the issue. The National Organization for
Marriage (NOM), for instance, flooded the airwaves with an advertisement
cataloging the harmful effects of same-sex marriage on "everyday Americans"
who, for instance, "must choose between [their] faith and [their] job[s]." 29
NOM gave the advertisement an ominous title-"Gathering Storm."
30
Indeed, same-sex marriage has provided a vehicle for Christian Right
advocates to frame their constituents' concerns in terms of discrimination.31 As
the National Litigation Director of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
declared, "Giving legal recognition to same-sex marriages promises to unleash
a host of legal and financial penalties on those who conscientiously object to
it .... 32 While religious objections are sincerely felt-and some of those
included in the civil union bill. See Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 12.
Governor Lincoln Chafee signed the bill reluctantly, noting the dangers of the broad religious
exemptions. Abby Goodnough, Rhode Island Senate Approves Civil Unions After Marriage Measure
Falters, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16; see also Jacqueline L. Salmon, Faith Groups Increasingly
Lose Gay Rights Fights, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A4 ("Gay rights groups said they do not
object to making faith groups' religious jobs exempt from the discrimination laws but that offering
services to the public is different.").
28. As the New York Times put it, "a long series of court battles regarding same-sex marriage
and religious freedom could be in the offmg, with ample room, given the multiplicity of statutes and
complexity of precedents, for unpredictable, inconsistent and controversial rulings." Peter Steinfels,
Beliefs: Advocates on Both Sides of the Same-Sex Marriage Issue See a Potential Clash with Religious
Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2006, at Al 1. Licensure is an area in which marriage recognition might
create new conflicts, with clerks objecting to issuing licenses to same-sex couples. See Thomas
Kaplan, Settled in Albany, Gay Marriage Is Still Drawing Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at
A20.
29. NOM Launches Nationwide "Two Million for Marriage" Initiative!, NAT'L ORG. FOR
MARRIAGE (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.nationfonnarriage.org/sitelapps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c~omL2K
eNOLzIH&b-5075189&ct-6877701 (last visited June 17, 2012).
30. Id.
31. See David Crary, Are the Victims Now the Victimizers?, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at
A25; cf NeJaime, supra note 7, at 323-25 (exploring rights claims by Christian Right advocates).
32. New Hampshire Gov. 's Same-Sex 'Marriage' Religious Freedom Plan Applies Only 'In
Some Instances,' CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (May 15, 2009, 8:14 PM), http://www.catholicnews
agency.com/news/new-hampshire-gov.s-samesex-marriage-religious-freedomplan applies-only-i
n some instances/ (last visited June 17, 2012); see also Severino, supra note 13, at 942. Severino, a
Becket Fund lawyer, argues that "[tihe movement for gay marriage is on a collision course with
religious liberty." Id. Matthew J. Franck, Director of the William E. and Carol G. Simon Center on
Religion and the Constitution at the Witherspoon Institute, strikes a similar note. See Matthew J.
Franck, Advocating Same-Sex Marriage: Consistency Is Another Victim, PUB. DISCOURSE, Dec. 15,
2011, http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/12/4451 (last visited June 17, 2012) ("Religious
dissenters from the new dispensation, in many tens of millions, will be second-class citizens, and will
be chased out of many professions and avenues of business if they will not abandon what their faiths
teach them about marriage. Their hospitals, schools, and charitable organizations will be pressured to
drop their religious scruples, and to silence their moral witness.").
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objections might very well be suitable for accommodation-some Christian
Right advocates use the issue of same-sex marriage to cast lesbians and gay
men as oppressors, seeking to use the force of the state to stamp out belief
systems with which they disagree. 33 For instance, Catholic Charities' decision
in Washington, D.C., to terminate spousal benefits creates a politically
compelling message for religious opposition to gay rights: the benefit to same-
sex couples is depicted as a net loss for society, and institutions that society
values claim that they can no longer participate in public life.
34
While Christian Right leaders attempt to block marriage equality
legislation, they also have developed a strategy to cope with the momentum
built by gay rights advocates. Rather than simply oppose marriage equality
laws, advocates urge inclusion of religious exemptions in the legislation. In
Washington State, for instance, religious leaders secured stronger
accommodations during the amendment process. 35 And in Connecticut, NOM
joined a religious liberty coalition urging broader religious exemptions during
the state legislature's codification of the court decision ordering marriage
equality. 36 This move is illustrative of a broad shift on the gay rights front: as
state actors have accepted gay equality norms, religious opponents have shifted
from straightforward claims against sexual orientation-based protections to
defensive claims that seek to limit or narrow such protections.37
It is not only advocates and lawmakers who situate religious objections
specifically in the context of marriage. Legal scholars analyzing the conflicts
between gay rights and religious freedom repeatedly position same-sex
marriage as the threat to religious liberty and thereby locate marriage as a novel
issue in the conflict between sexual orientation nondiscrimination and religious
freedom. Professor Mary Ann Glendon issued an early warning, arguing that
"[e]very person and every religion that disagrees [with same-sex marriage] will
be labeled as bigoted and openly discriminated against. The ax will fall most
heavily on religious persons and groups that don't go along. Religious
33. Professor Murray charts this shrewd deployment in the Proposition 8 campaign. See
Murray, supra note 9, at 103.
34. In a letter to President Obama critical of the administration's position on the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, Archbishop Timothy Dolan, President of the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, claimed, "Society will suffer when religious entities are compelled to remove themselves
from the social service network due to their duty to maintain their institutional integrity and not
compromise on basic moral principles." USCCB Staff Analysis of Recent Threats to Marriage April-
August 2011, attached to Letter from Timothy Dolan, Archbishop of N.Y. & President of U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S., (Sept. 20, 2011).
35. See Lomet Tumbull, Gay-Marriage-Bill Change Would Exempt Religious-School
Chapels, Gives Clergy Right Not to 'Recognize' Wedlock House Schedules Floor Vote on Bill
Wednesday, SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2012, at B 1.
36. See NOM Joins CT Religious Liberty Campaign!, NAT'L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE,
http://www.nationfonrmarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=omL2KeNLzH&b=5075189&ct=
6908783 (last visited June 17, 2012).
37. See Douglas NeJaime, New Entrants Bring New Questions, 19 L. & SEXUALITY 181, 185
(2010); Murray, supra note 9, at 152.
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institutions will be hit with lawsuits if they refuse to compromise their
principles." 38 A recent volume of essays, edited by prominent religious liberty
scholars Professors Douglas Laycock and Robin Fretwell Wilson, ratchets
down the rhetoric used by Glendon but nonetheless affirms the unique
relationship between same-sex marriage and threats to religious freedom.39 In
it, Wilson refers to "the looming tide of litigation" that same-sex marriage will
bring.40 Moreover, some commentators see same-sex marriage as such a
specific issue for religious freedom, untethered to sexual orientation
nondiscrimination more generally, that they refer to "marriage discrimination"
and "same-sex marriage antidiscrimination laws.'
41
Many of these scholars exert direct and substantial influence over
advocates' positions and legislators' debates. NOM, for example, cited leading
42
religious liberty scholars to bolster its position. That group of scholars, which
includes Professors Thomas Berg, Carl Esbeck, Richard Garnett, Laycock, and
Wilson, has written to state lawmakers in a number of states considering
marriage equality. In a letter to the Connecticut legislature, for instance, they
warned of significant conflicts between same-sex couples and religious
individuals, all of which "either did not exist before, or will be significantly
intensified after, the legalization of same-sex marriage.' '43 They predicted that
"the volume of new litigation will be immense" and claimed that it is
38. Mary Ann Glendon, For Better or for Worse?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14.
39. See SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 13. Anthony R. Picarello,
Jr., General Counsel for the Conference of Catholic Bishops, is also a coeditor of the volume.
40. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from
the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 77, 102
[hereinafter Wilson, Matters of Conscience].
41. Bold, supra note 13 (including in his title the term "same-sex marriage antidiscrimination
laws"); Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note
13, at 189, 197 [hereinafter Laycock, Afterword] (referring to "marriage discrimination"). Fortunately,
some scholars have attempted to untangle the conflation of religious objections and marriage. As
Professor Cass Sunstein told the New York Times, same-sex marriage does not raise entirely new
issues but instead highlights existing tensions "'between antidiscrimination norms and deeply held
religious convictions."' Steinfels, supra note 28, at A11. Professor Dale Carpenter has noted that he is
"not convinced that gay marriage adds much to the pre-existing confrontation between religious
traditionalists and antidiscrimination laws protecting gays." Dale Carpenter, Protecting Religious
Liberty from Gay Marriage and Protecting Gay Marriage from Religious Liberty, VOLOKH
CONsPIRAcY, (Apr. 23, 2009, 1:16 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/1240449003.shtml (last visited June
17, 2012). And Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle have argued that "the conflict between gay
equality and religious freedom is not restricted to disputes over the legality of same-sex marriage....
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 276.
42. See National Organization for Marriage to Critics: Gay Marriage Has Real Consequences
for Religious Liberty, NAT'L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE (Apr. 22,2009), http://www.nationformarriage.org/
site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=omL2KeNOLzH&b='5075189&ct-6937055 (last visited June 17,
2012).
43. Berg et al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 5. Laycock endorsed the letter by the other four
scholars but wrote separately to register his support for same-sex marriage. See Laycock, Conn. Letter,
supra note 16, at 1. He has continued to send separate letters. See infra note 46.
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"impossible to predict the outcome of future litigation over these conflicts. ' ,4
Religious liberty advocates, they maintained, will "litigate these claims
vigorously under any protections available under state and federal law" and
will "sue state and local governments for implementing, or even considering
implementing, policies that harm conscientious objectors. 'A5 These scholars
sent similar letters to the New Hampshire and Maine governors and to
lawmakers in Iowa, New York, New Jersey, Washington, and Maryland when
their states were considering marriage equality legislation.
46
In urging the Connecticut legislature to include robust religious
accommodations in its marriage legislation, Laycock argued that religious
exemptions could defuse much of the controversy. As he explained:
To impose legal penalties or civil liabilities on a wedding planner who
refuses to do a same-sex wedding, or on a religious counseling agency
that refuses to provide marriage counseling to same-sex couples, will
simply ensure that conservative religious opinion on this issue can
repeatedly be aroused to fever pitch.47
He also claimed that accommodation would impose a relatively minor burden
on same-sex couples, given the benefits of working with willing service
providers and the likelihood of many willing providers in the state.48 Laycock
44. See Berg et al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 5.
45. Id.
46. See Berg et al., Me. Letter, supra note 16; Berg et al., N.H. Letter, supra note 16; Berg et
al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15; Wilson et al., Md. Letter, supra note 15; Wilson et al., N.J. Letter,
supra note 15; Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15; Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15.
Again, it is unclear from the publicly available version to whom the letter regarding Iowa was sent. See
Wilson et al., Iowa Letter, supra note 15. They also wrote to Washington Representative Frank Chopp
and Governor Chris Gregoire to argue for more robust religious exemptions than those included in the
marriage bill. See Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Chair of 1958 Law Alumni Professor of Law,
Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar Professor of Law & Pub. Pol'y,
Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law (Minn.), Carl H. Esbeck, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of
Law, Richard W. Gamett, Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., & Marc D. Stem,
Member of the N.Y. Bar, to Frank Chopp, Speaker of the House, Wash. State House of
Representatives (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://mirrorofustice.blogs.com/files/washington-
followup-house-members-6239-es2.7.2012-l.pdf; Letter from Robin Fretwell Wilson, Chair of 1958
Law Alumni Professor of Law, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Thomas C. Berg, James Oberstar
Professor of Law & Pub. Pol'y, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch, of Law (Minn.), Richard W. Gamett,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch., & Marc D. Stem, Member of the N.Y. Bar, to Chris
Gregoire, Governor of Wash. (Jan. 29, 2012), available at http://mirrorofiustice.blogs.com/files/
washington-followup-house-members-6239-es2.7.2012-1.pdf As he did in Connecticut, Laycock also
wrote individually to the Maine governor. See Laycock, Me. Letter, supra note 16. He was joined by
Stem and Professors Andrew Koppelman and Michael Perry in letters to the New Hampshire and New
York governors, and in a letter to Iowa lawmakers. See Laycock et al., Iowa Letter, supra note 15;
Laycock et al., N.H. Letter, supra note 15; Laycock et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15. More recently,
he was joined by Stem and Perry in a letter to Washington state lawmakers. See Laycock et al., Wash.
Letter, supra note 15.
47. Laycock, Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 1-2.
48. See id. at 2.
[Vol. 100: 11691184
MARRIAGE INEQUALITY
predicted that the number of religious exemptions sought would be small and
would dissipate over time.
49
Intervention by religious liberty scholars has to some extent shaped
legislative deliberations. In Connecticut, for instance, lawmakers extensively
considered religious freedom issues only after the subject attracted significant
attention.50 At that point, lawmakers contemplated some of the potential
conflicts raised by scholars and codified some of the proposed exemptions.
Religious liberty scholars and advocates, in turn, greeted the legislative result
with measured approval.i'
B. The Proposed "Marriage Conscience Protection"
In writing to state lawmakers considering marriage equality, the religious
liberty scholars have proposed a specific "marriage conscience protection" to
be included in marriage legislation. While they have refined their proposal over
52time, the essential components have remained consistent. Their 2009 proposalto the Connecticut legislature provides a useful illustration:
49. See id. But see Flynn, supra note 13, at 241.
50. See Daniela Altimari, Groups Want Faith Exemption, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 21,
2009, at Al ("Through a high-profile campaign that includes robocalls, TV spots, newspaper ads and
messages from the pulpit, the Roman Catholic Church and other groups, both local and national, are
making a last-ditch effort to carve out legal protections for business owners and professionals who
oppose same-sex marriage on religious grounds."); Susan Haigh, Vote Caps Decade-Long Marriage
Fight in Conn., TULSA WORLD (Apr. 23, 2009, 2:10 PM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printer
friendlystory.aspx?articleid=20090423 13 0 HARTFO895277&PrintCommentsl ("In an effort to
appease some gay marriage foes, who've deluged the legislature with thousands of calls in recent days,
the Senate amended the bill to make it clear that lawmakers want to protect religious liberties.").
51. See Berg et al., N.H. Letter, supra note 16, at 6 ("Although ... Connecticut's protections
are important, they leave out a number of the foreseeable collisions between same-sex marriage and
religious liberty. ... ); Connecticut Legislators Vote Religious Liberty Protection in Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.kofc.org/en/news/legislative/
detailI548445.html (last visited June 17, 2012) ("While not as strong an amendment as we would have
preferred, it represents a significant step toward recognizing the need to ensure that First Amendment
religious freedoms . . . are weighed properly .... "); National Organization for Marriage
Congratulates the People of Connecticut on Their Victory for Religious Liberty, NAT'L ORG. FOR
MARRIAGE (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c
=omL2KeNOLzH&b=5075189&ct-6938 4 83 (last visited June 17, 2012) ("The National Organization
for Marriage (NOM) applauds the Connecticut legislature which, in a surprise move today, adopted
substantive religious liberty protections as part of what was expected to be a routine bill implementing
the Connecticut court decision ordering same-sex marriage."). The Connecticut marriage law provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religious organization, association or society,
or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in
conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, shall not be required to
provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges to an
individual if the request for such services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or
privileges is related to the solemnization of a marriage or celebration of a marriage and such
solemnization or celebration is in violation of their religious beliefs and faith.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35a (West 2009).
52. Compare Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4, with Berg et al., Conn. Letter,
supra note 16, at 7-8.
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No individual and no religious corporation, entity, association,
educational institution, or society shall be penalized or denied benefits
under the laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including
but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing,
public accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or
tax-exempt status, for refusing to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization
of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any marriage, or for
refusing to treat as valid any marriage, where such providing,
solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause that individual or
religious corporation, entity[,] association, educational institution, or
society to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.53
While some legislatures have adopted portions of this provision, they have
generally rejected the most sweeping components.54 The laws of Connecticut,
53. Berg et al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 7-8. Religious liberty scholars proposed similar
provisions in New Hampshire and Maine. See Berg et al., N.H. Letter, supra note 16, at 7; Berg et al.,
Me. Letter, supra note 16, at 9. They proposed revised versions in Iowa, New Jersey, New York,
Washington, and Maryland. See Wilson et al., Iowa Letter, supra note 15, at 8-9; Wilson et al., Md.
Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4; Wilson et al., N.J. Letter, supra note 15, at 2-4; Wilson et al., N.Y.
Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4; Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4. The most recent
proposal provides, in relevant part:
(a) Religious organizations protected.
No religious or denominational organization, no organization operated for charitable or
educational purposes which is supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious
organization, and no individual employed by any of the foregoing organizations, while
acting in the scope of that employment, shall be required to
1. provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges for a
purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of any marriage; or
2. solemnize any marriage; or
3. treat as valid any marriage
if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such organizations or
individuals to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.
(b) Individuals and small businesses protected.
1. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), no individual, sole proprietor, or small
business shall be required to
a) provide goods or services that assist or promote the solemnization or
celebration of any marriage, or provide counseling or other services that
directly facilitate the perpetuation of any marriage; or
b) provide benefits to any spouse of an employee; or
c) provide housing to any married couple
if providing such goods, services, benefits, or housing would cause such individuals or sole
proprietors, or owners of such small businesses, to violate their sincerely held religious
beliefs.
2. Paragraph (b)(1) shall not apply if
a) a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar good [sic] or services,
employment benefits, or housing elsewhere without substantial hardship; or
b) in the case of an individual who is a government employee or official, if another
government employee or official is not promptly available and willing to provide
the requested government service without inconvenience or delay; provided that
no judicial officer authorized to solemnize marriages shall be required to
solemnize any marriage if to do so would violate the judicial officer's sincerely
held religious beliefs.
Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4.
54. Some of the current provisions included in marriage legislation purport to provide
meaningful protection for religious interests but largely restate well-settled principles of constitutional
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New York, New Hampshire, and Vermont exempt religious entities from
providing "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges" relating to "the solemnization or celebration of a marriage."
55
Vermont law also exempts fraternal organizations from providing "insurance
benefits to any person if to do so would violate the society's free exercise of
religion .... 56 Connecticut law provides that the codification of marriage for
same-sex couples shall not "affect the manner in which a religious organization
may provide adoption, foster care or social services if such religious
organization does not receive state or federal funds for that specific program or
purpose." 57 Approaching more long-term effects, New Hampshire law permits
religious organizations and their employees to refuse to provide "services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges" related to "the
promotion of marriage through religious counseling, programs, courses,
retreats, or housing designated for married individuals."
5
law, providing that religious bodies would not be required to perform or bless same-sex marriages. See
Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41, at 200 ("[W]ithin the church itself, I think the protection for
religious dissenters from same-sex marriage is substantially absolute. No one can have a legal right to
a religious service or ritual; there can be no Catholic wedding or Baptist wedding except on terms
acceptable to those responsible for Catholic or Baptist churches.... Legally coerced religious services
are utterly inconsistent with free exercise of religion."); Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40,
at 95 (explaining that such provisions "accomplish little more than the protection the Constitution
already provides"). For an explanation of the constitutional rationale on which such exemptions are
based, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 284-85.
55. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b (McKinney 2012); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
35a (West 2009) (using the same language with slight differences in punctuation and phrasing); N.H.
REV. STAT. § 457:37(1I) (2009) (same). It is important to note that Vermont provides this exemption
through its antidiscrimination law, rather than through its marriage statute. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
4502(1) (West 2009).
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4501(b) (2009). Connecticut and New Hampshire included a
similar benefits provision. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-l 50d (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457:37(IV) (2011).
57. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35b (West 2009).
58. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37(111) (2011). See also D.C. Code § 46-406(e)(1) (2011)
(referring to "a religious society, or a nonprofit organization that is operated, supervised, or controlled
by or in conjunction with a religious society, shall not be required to provide services,
accommodations, facilities, or goods for a purpose related to the solemnization or celebration of a
marriage, or the promotion of marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats,
that is in violation of the religious society's beliefs"). Maryland and Washington recently passed
marriage equality legislation, but opponents are seeking to block the legislation by referendum. The
Maryland law includes a religious exemption that applies to religious entities (referring to "a religious
organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised,
or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society") and specifically to "services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges.., related to... the solemnization.., or
celebration of a marriage. .. or... the promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs
or services." Md. H.B. 438 § 3 (Feb. 1, 2012). Washington's law provides that "[n]o religious
organization is required to provide accommodations, facilities, advantages, privileges, services, or
goods related to the solemnization or celebration of a marriage." Wash. SB 6239 § 1(5) (Feb. 13,
2012). Additionally, the law exempts "religious-based services . . . delivered by a religious
organization... designed for married couples or couples engaged to marry and.., directly related to
solemnizing, celebrating, strengthening, or promoting a marriage." Id. at § 1(7).
11872012]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
Rhode Island, which initiated same-sex relationship recognition through
civil unions rather than marriage, adopted the most sweeping religious
accommodation to date. The law allows religious organizations, including
hospitals, schools, and community centers, to refuse to "treat as valid any civil
union." 59 Governor Lincoln Chafee noted the "unparalleled and alarming
scope" of the exemption yet signed it nonetheless. 60 While the Rhode Island
exemption adopts one of the most far-reaching components of the proposed
"marriage conscience protection"--the refusal to treat as valid-it does not go
as far as including religiously unaffiliated individuals in the stream of
commerce (e.g., small business owners, landlords, nonreligious employers).
It is clear that even though much of the focus remains on the activity of
legislatures, courts, and advocacy organizations, legal scholars are shaping the
discourse and influencing the course of legislation. Accordingly, close attention
to their interventions is vital. While some prominent religious liberty scholars
have offered more limited religious accommodations than those included in the
"marriage conscience protection," 61 for purposes of this Article, I focus on the
proposal offered by Berg, Esbeck, Garnett, Laycock, and Wilson. Given their
appeal to state lawmakers, their contributions have had the most influence on
the ground. And because of their early attention to the issue and their prolific
writing on the topic, their proposal has largely shaped the academic discourse.
62
These scholars' focus on religious liberty specifically within the context
of marriage distorts the debate, hiding important instances of sexual orientation
discrimination and obscuring the primary basis of religious objections. The
issue of same-sex marriage is illustrative-rather than exhaustive--of instances
of religiously motivated discrimination against lesbians and gay men. By using
marriage legislation both to protect same-sex couples and to carve out religious
exemptions from nondiscrimination requirements, these scholars are asking
marriage to do work properly handled by antidiscrimination law and, in the
process, may be undermining progress on the antidiscrimination front.
59. R.I. GEN LAWS § 15-3.1-5 (2011). See also Goodnough, supra note 27. Gay rights
advocates urged Governor Chafee to veto the Rhode Island bill because of the sweeping exemption.
See, e.g., Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 12.
60. Zach Howard, Rhode Island Governor Signs Gay Civil Union Law Despite Doubts,
REUTERS, (July 2, 2011, 5:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/02/us-gaymarriage-
rhodeisland-idUSTRE761l JF20110702 (last visited June 17, 2012).
61. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 13, at 392; Alan Brownstein, Religious Freedom and Gay
Marriage Can Coexist, L.A. TtMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinionla/
la-oew-brownstein l-2009may1l1,0,426780.story [hereinafter Brownstein, Religious Freedom and
Gay Marriage Can Coexist]. While these accommodations evince significant appreciation for the
harms of discrimination to lesbians and gay men, they nonetheless replicate the focus on marriage that
distracts from the broader antidiscrimination questions posed by discrimination against same-sex
relationships. See, e.g., Brownstein, Religious Freedom and Gay Marriage Can Coexist, supra
(arguing that "religious institutions should be granted an exemption from having to recognize the
validity of same-sex marriages most of the time").
62. An entire issue of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy was devoted to their
proposal. See 5 Nw. J. L & SOC. POL'Y 1 (2010).
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C. Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law
The proposed "marriage conscience protection," which purports to resolve
disputes between same-sex couples and religious objectors in the context of
marriage, intervenes against an evolving framework of state antidiscrimination
law63 that protects lesbians and gay men in a range of settings. 64 Indeed, the
states that have recognized marriage for same-sex couples-and even those
states that currently offer only nonmarital relationship recognition to same-sex
couples-have in place antidiscrimination laws that include sexual
orientation.
65
63. Current federal antidiscrimination law does not explicitly include sexual orientation. For an
analysis of coverage of sexual orientation under Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination as well as
a discussion of federal constitutional principles governing public employers, see Jennifer C. Pizer et
al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT People: The Need
for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employee Benefits, 45
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 715, 742-47, 750-54 (2012).
64. While I am focusing here on statutory antidiscrimination protections, which generally
regulate both private and governmental actors, state constitutional protections may also prohibit sexual
orientation discrimination by public employers. In fact, in marriage decisions, some state courts have
announced powerful constitutional norms of sexual orientation nondiscrimination. See Vamum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008);
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded in part by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). The scholars
proposing the "marriage conscience protection" focus primarily on (religious and secular) private
actors. Wilson, however, has written about the need to include some government employees, and the
proposed "marriage conscience protection" includes such employees. See Wilson, Insubstantial
Burdens, supra note 13; Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15.
65. Six states-Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and
Vermont-and the District of Columbia currently allow same-sex couples to marry. California allowed
same-sex couples to marry for a brief period in 2008, and the state recognizes same-sex couples'
marriages from other jurisdictions if they were entered into before November 5, 2008. See CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308(b) (West 2012). Maryland and Washington are poised to allow same-sex couples to
marry, but opponents are attempting to block the legislation by referendum. Voters in Maine may also
decide in November whether to allow same-sex couples there to marry. Assuming the recently passed
marriage laws in Maryland and Washington stand, the states offering nonmarital recognition are
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin. For a comprehensive account of state relationship recognition laws, see Edward Stein,
The Topography of Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 181 (2012).
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Twenty-one states66 and the District of Columbia67 cover sexual
orientation in their antidiscrimination laws governing employment,68 housing,
and public accommodations. 69 Many of these statutes contain limited religious
66. These states are: California (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940, 12955 (Deering 2012)
(employment and housing); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering 2012) (public accommodations));
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2012) (employment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502
(2012) (housing); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2012) (public accommodations)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81c to e (2009) (employment, housing, and public accommodations));
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 19, § 711 (2012) (employment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (2012)
(housing); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 6, § 4504 (2012) (public accommodations)); Hawaii (HAW. REV.
STAT. § 378-2 (2009) (employment); HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-3 (2009) (housing); HAW. REV. STAT. §
489-3 (2009) (public accommodations)); Illinois (775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2012) (employment,
housing, and public accommodations)); Iowa (IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2011) (employment); IOWA CODE
§ 216.8 (2011) (housing); IOWA CODE § 216.7 (2011) (public accommodations)); Maine (ME. REV.
STAT ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (2011) (employment); ME. REV. STAT ANN. fit. 5, § 4582 (2011) (housing);
ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 5, § 4592 (2011) (public accommodations)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE. GOV'T §20-606 (West 2011) (employment); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §20-705 (West
2011) (housing); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §20-304 (West 2011) (public accommodations));
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2011) (employment and housing); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272 § 92A (2011) (public accommodations)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2011)
(employment); MINN. STAT. § 363A.09 (2011) (housing); MINN. STAT. § 363A. 11 (2011) (public
accommodations)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2011) (employment); NEV. REV. STAT. §
118.100 (2011) (housing); NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.070 (2011) (public accommodations); New
Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (2011) (employment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:10 (2011) (housing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (2011) (public accommodations)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2012) (employment, housing, and public accommodations));
New Mexico (N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7 (2011) (employment, housing, and public accommodations)); New
York (N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 2011) (employment); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2-a)
(McKinney 2011) (housing); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney 2011) (public accommodations));
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2009) (employment); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421 (2009)
(housing); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2009) (public accommodations)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 28-5-7 (2012) (employment); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4 (2012) (housing); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-24-2 (2012) (public accommodations)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2009)
(employment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (2009) (housing); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2009)
(public accommodations)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (2012) (employment);
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222 (2012) (housing); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.215 (2012) (public
accommodations)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 111.322 (2011) (employment); WIS. STAT. § 106.50
(2011) (housing); WIS. STAT. § 106.52 (2011) (public accommodations)).
67. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2012) (employment); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21 (2012) (housing);
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.31 (2012) (public accommodations).
68. For a comparative examination of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws in the
workplace, see William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical Assessment, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 65 (2001). The proposed federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in employment. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011). As currently drafted, it would exempt employers with fewer than
fifteen employees as well as bona fide private membership clubs. See id. at §§ 3a(4), 11. ENDA would
also exempt any organization that under Title VII is allowed to restrict employment based on religion.
Id. at § 6. This includes any "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society ......
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (2006), as amended by Civil Rights Act of
1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
69. Many jurisdictions also have separate statutes specifically governing education. See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2012); IOWA CODE § 216.9 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4602(4)
(2011). In addition, more than 200 cities and counties prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in
employment. See Pizer et al., supra note 63, at 757.
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exemptions, which apply only to religious and religiously affiliated
organizations, and generally do not accommodate secular actors or
government entities. 71 Although it is difficult to make generalizations about the
laws of twenty-two jurisdictions72 and the scope of coverage is often
ambiguous absent judicial determinations, the laws share some common
features that suggest relatively clear parameters of coverage.
Laws governing public accommodations-the area most targeted by the
proposed "marriage conscience protection"--broadly cover places and facilities
offering goods or services to the public.73 Religious organizations generally are
considered private and thus not subject to regulation.74 Facilities and services
70. Of course, the definition of covered religious entities varies by state. Compare N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296(11) (McKinney 2011) ("any religious or denominational institution or organization, or any
organization operated for charitable or educational purposes, which is operated, supervised or
controlled by or in connection with a religious organization"), with WIS. STAT. § 11 1.32(12m) (2011)
("Religious association' means an organization... which operates under a creed.").
71. I am dealing only with statutory exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, not
constitutional rights that might impact the application of such laws. Moreover, I am not addressing
general religious liberty legislation, such as federal and state Religious Freedom and Restoration Acts
(RFRAs). For an analysis of such legislation and the relationship between adjudication and legislative
decision making, see Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1465, 1474-76 (1999). For consideration of the interaction between state RFRAs and
antidiscrimination laws, see Robert M. O'Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State
RFRA Laws Versus CivilRights, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785 (1999).
72. See Marc D. Stem, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUs LIBERTY, supra note 13, at 1, 53 (noting that "[e]xemptions from the civil rights laws
follow a crazy quilt pattem" and "differ in their description of the exempted entities").
73. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2012) (including any "place of business engaged
in any sales to the public and any place offering services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to the public," including hospitals and educational institutions). California's public
accommodations statute is somewhat unique. It uses both narrower ("business establishments") and
broader ("every kind whatsoever") terminology. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (Deering 2011)
(covering "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever"); Harris v. Mothers Again Drunk
Driving, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 835 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that "[a]n organization is not excluded
from the ambit of the [public accommodations law] simply because it is private or non-profit").
74. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2012) ("'Place of public accommodation' shall
not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious
purposes."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 18 (2011) ("Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or organization . .. from limiting
admission to or giving preference to persons of the same religion or denomination or from making
such selection as is calculated by such organization to promote the religious principles for which it is
established or maintained."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 2011) ("For purposes of this
section, a corporation incorporated under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent
orders law but formed under any other law of this state or a religious corporation incorporated under
the education law or the religious corporations law shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly
private."); Doe v. Cal. Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n, 170 Cal. App. 4th 828 (2009) (holding that a private,
religious school run by a religious organization is not a business establishment under the Unnth Civil
Rights Act and accordingly, cannot be sued under the state's sexual orientation antidiscrimination
law). Minnesota's public accommodations law explicitly carves out sexual orientation for religious
organizations. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.26 (2011) ("Nothing in this chapter prohibits any religious
association ... from[,] ... in matters relating to sexual orientation, taking any action with respect to...
use of facilities.").
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operated by or affiliated with religious organizations, however, do not receive
blanket exemptions from public accommodations laws. 75  A religious
organization may convert its space or service into a public accommodation by
opening it to the general public or engaging in commercial activity rather than
maintaining it for distinctly private use.7 6 In any event, when public
accommodations laws include religious exemptions, those exemptions are
limited to religious or religiously affiliated organizations. 77 They do not reach
secular actors in the stream of commerce. In other words, they do not cover
businesses such as florists, wedding planners, photographers, bakeries, caterers,
and restaurants.
Every state employment nondiscrimination statute that includes sexual
orientation features a religious exemption, 78  and, as in the public
accommodations context, these exemptions are limited to religious employers.
Some states simply exclude religious organizations from the definition of
employer but provide no comparable exemption for secular employers.79 Rather
75. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008, at 7 (N.J. Dep't
of Law and Pub. Safety, Dec. 29, 2008) (explaining that under New Jersey's Law Against
Discrimination, "there is no blanket exemption covering all types of facilities operated by religious
organizations"); see also Doe, 170 Cal. App. 4th at 836 (explaining that religious nonprofits may be
"business establishments" for purposes of antidiscrimination law when they engage in commercial
activity).
76. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.26 (2011) (providing that the religious exemption "shall not
apply to secular business activities engaged in by the religious association, religious corporation, or
religious society, the conduct of which is unrelated to the religious and educational purposes for which
it is organized"); Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 7-9. See also Severino, supra note 13, at 965
(arguing that "[t]he risk of being regulated by public accommodations laws is especially acute for
those religious institutions with very open policies concerning membership and provision of services"
and pointing to potential regulation relating to "counseling services, soup kitchens, job training
programs, health care services, day care services, schooling, adoption services, and even use of
wedding reception facilities").
77. Note that some public accommodations laws explicitly exclude private clubs and fraternal
organizations. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040 (2012) ("[Njothing contained in this definition
shall be construed to include or apply to any institute, bona fide club, or place of accommodation,
which is by its nature distinctly private, including fraternal organizations, though where public use is
permitted that use shall be covered by this chapter.").
78. See BRAD SEARS ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION ON THE
BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY IN STATE EMPLOYMENT 15-11 (2009),
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/15_ENDAvStateLaws2.pdf.
79. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(d) (Deering 2011) ("'Employer' does not include a
religious association or corporation not organized for private profit."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:2(VII) (2011) ('Employer' does not include ... a fraternal or religious association or corporation[]
if such ... association[] or corporation is not organized for private profit .... ); WASH. REV. CODE §
49.60.040(11) (2012) ("'Employer' . .. does not include any religious or sectarian organization not
organized for private profit."). Even broad exemptions may have limitations. California's law, for
instance, provides only partial exemptions for religious employers operating educational institutions or
healthcare facilities. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926.2(c) (Deering 2011). Moreover, "religious
employer" may be statutorily defined in ways that preclude its application to certain employers, such
as religiously affiliated social services organizations. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Super.
Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that "Catholic Charities does not qualify as a 'religious
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than exclude religious employers entirely, most states provide limited carve-
outs. Some allow religious organizations to take employment actions that are
aimed at promoting the organization's religious principles. 80 Others permit
religious employers to use religion as a factor in employment,8' but frequently
limit the use of religion to employment positions that concern the religious
purpose of the organization. 82 A few states explicitly allow religious employers
to use sexual orientation as a factor in employment decisions when the
employer deems sexual orientation to constitute a qualification related to a
religious purpose.83 Overall, then, a religious employer generally may make
decisions on a limited number of employment issues or about a limited class of
employer' under the [Women's Contraception Equity Act] because it does not meet any of the
definition's four criteria").
80. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-3(5) (2009) (allowing religious organization to make
decisions "calculated to promote the religious principles for which the organization is established or
maintained"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1(5) (2011) (allowing a religious organization "which
limits membership, enrollment, admission, or participation to members of that religion" to take "any
action with respect to matters of employment . . . which [is] calculated by such organization to
promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained").
81. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-3(5) (2009) (not prohibiting religious organizations
"from giving preference to individuals of the same religion or denomination"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 5 § 4573-A(2) (West 2011) (allowing a religious organization to "require that all applicants and
employees conform to the religious tenets of that organization"). Under Title VII, religious employers
may discriminate in favor of members of their own religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006). For
discussion of this in the context of lesbian and gay workers, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 304.
82. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(2) (2012) (allowing a religious employer to
limit hiring to individuals of a particular religion "to perform work connected with the carrying on by
[the religious organization]"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(7)(ii) (2012) ("Nothing in this subdivision
shall be construed to apply to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of its religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on of its activities."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(e) (2009) (allowing a religious
organization to take employment actions regarding positions created to promote the organization's
religious principles); WIS. STAT. § 11 1.337(2)(am) (2011) (allowing "a religious association ... to
give preference to an applicant or employee who adheres to the religious association's creed, if the job
description demonstrates that the position is clearly related to the religious teachings and beliefs of the
religious association").
83. See IOWA CODE § 216.6(6)(d) (2011) (allowing the use of sexual orientation (and other
factors) in employment decisions "when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious
purpose"); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-604 (2011) ("This subtitle does not apply to.. . a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion or sexual orientation to perform work connected with the activities
of the religious entity."); MINN. STAT. § 363A.20(2)(subd. 2) (2011) (providing an exemption when
"religion or sexual orientation shall be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment"); OR.
REv. STAT. § 659A.006(5) (2009) ("It is not an unlawful employment practice for a bona fide church
or other religious institution to take any employment action based on a bona fide religious belief about
sexual orientation: (a) In employment positions directly related to the operation of a church or other
place of worship, such as clergy, religious instructors and support staff; (b) In employment positions in
a nonprofit religious school, nonprofit religious camp, nonprofit religious day care center, nonprofit
religious thrift store, nonprofit religious bookstore, nonprofit religious radio station or nonprofit
religious shelter; or (c) In other employment positions that involve religious activities, as long as the
employment involved is closely connected with or related to the primary purposes of the church or
institution and is not connected with a commercial or business activity that has no necessary
relationship to the church or institution.").
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employees based on religious considerations, but must otherwise refrain from
discrimination. 84 Again, secular employers do not possess statutory rights to
use religious beliefs as a basis for discrimination against lesbian and gay
workers. Some state statutes, however, exclude very small employers-those
with only very few employees-from coverage, thus exempting a narrow set of
secular employers from nondiscrimination mandates.
85
Antidiscrimination statutes governing housing also frequently contain
exemptions aimed explicitly at religious organizations, provided the housing is
not used for commercial purposes.8 6 As with some employment statutes that
84. I am not addressing the constitutional dimensions of exemptions from employment
nondiscrimination regulations. For case law and commentary relating to the judicially created
ministerial exception from employment nondiscrimination mandates, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification
of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 575-76 (1999); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 395-99
(1987). For analysis of constitutional claims relating specifically to sexual orientation
nondiscrimination mandates, see Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization:
First Amendment Principles and Anti-discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189 (1999);
Jillian T. Weiss, The First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion, Nondiscrimination Statutes
Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and the Free Exercise Claims of Non-Church-
Related Employers, 12 FLA. COASTALL. REV. 15 (2010).
85. A minority of state statutes track federal antidiscrimination law's exclusion of employers
with fewer than fifteen employees. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. §
613.310(2) (2011). Most, however, either include all employers within the coverage of the law, see,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-401 (2011); HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 5 § 4553(4) (West 2011), or exclude only much smaller employers, see, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE §
12926(d) (Deering 2011) (fewer than five employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-51(10) (2009) (fewer
than three employees); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 19 § 710(6) (2011) (fewer than four employees); IOWA
CODE § 216.6(6)(a) (2011) (fewer than four employees). See also SEARS ET AL., supra note 78, at 15-
11 ("Seventeen state anti-discrimination statutes prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination apply to
employers with fewer than 15 employees. In eight of these states, the statute applies to all employers
regardless of size. The anti-discrimination statutes of the remaining four states apply to only employers
with 15 or more employees."). In addition, some statutes explicitly exclude private social clubs and
fraternal associations. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.310(2)(c) (2011) (excluding "any private
membership club exempt from taxation"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.. § 354-A:2(VII) (2011) (excluding
"an exclusively social club, or a fratemal or religious association or corporation, if such club,
association, or corporation is not organized for private profit").
86. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4504 (2009) (exempting "a religious organization,
association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by
or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society, which limits the sale, rental or
occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of
the same religion"). Similar to the employment context, some housing exemptions specifically allow a
religious entity to use sexual orientation as a qualification when the religious entity deems sexual
orientation related to a religious purpose. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.12(l)(a) (2011) (exempting
"[a]ny bona fide religious institution with respect to any qualifications it may impose based on
religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, when the qualifications are related to a bona fide
religious purpose unless the religious institution owns or operates property for a commercial
purpose"); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.006(3) (2009) ("It is not an unlawful practice for a bona fide
church or other religious institution to take any action with respect to housing or the use of facilities
based on a bona fide religious belief about sexual orientation as long as the housing or the use of
facilities is closely connected with or related to the primary purposes of the church or institution and is
[Vol. 100: 11691194
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exclude very small employers from coverage, similar carve-outs in housing
statutes would accommodate religious objections by secular commercial actors
in a small subset of situations. Connecticut law, for instance, provides that the
housing statute does not apply to "a unit in a dwelling containing not more than
four units if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such other units
as his residence." 87 This type of owner-occupied, few-unit exception is
common, 88 permitting a narrow class of property owners to make decisions in
light of their religious beliefs.
It is not surprising that states that have recognized marriage for same-sex
couples or have provided nonmarital relationship recognition are also those that
have in place antidiscrimination protections that include sexual orientation.
These states already had embraced a nondiscrimination norm based on sexual
orientation, and the formal recognition of same-sex relationships is in many
ways consistent with that norm. Yet given that states had been working out the
meaning of sexual orientation nondiscrimination against the backdrop of
discriminatory relationship regimes, the emergence of legally recognized same-
sex relationships may press issues of sexual orientation discrimination more
forcefully and produce new situations implicating private actors'
nondiscrimination obligations to same-sex couples. The determination of
whether to allow religiously motivated discrimination against legally
recognized same-sex couples requires the application of sexual orientation
antidiscrimination law and existing exemptions. The "marriage conscience
protection" proposed in states codifying marriage equality seeks to alter the
antidiscrimination calculus, but it does so through targeted provisions in the
marriage statutes, rather than through a resolution specifically in the domain of
antidiscrimination law.
II.
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS AND LESBIAN AND GAY IDENTITY
While the conflict between sexual orientation nondiscrimination and the
religiously motivated desire to discriminate based on sexual orientation
primarily plays out through the same-sex marriage debate, the terms of that
debate obscure the identity-based stakes involved. Of course, the religious
not connected with a commercial or business activity that has no necessary relationship to the church
or institution.").
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-8le (2009).
88. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 216.12(1)(b) (2011) (exempting "[tihe rental or leasing of a
dwelling in a building which contains housing accommodations for not more than two families living
independently of each other, if the owner resides in one of the housing accommodations"); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-37-4.4 (2012) (allowing refusal "to rent to a person based on his or her sexual orientation if
the housing accommodation is three (3) units or less, one (1) of which is occupied by the owner"); see
also Stem, supra note 72, at 54 (discussing "the common 'Mrs. Murphy's boarding house'
exemption[s]"). In addition to owner-occupied housing with few units, Minnesota law exempts any
rental unit in a dwelling with two units or less. See MINN. STAT. § 363A.21(3) (2011).
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significance of marriage suggests that faith-based issues may arise.
Nonetheless, it is the enactment of lesbian and gay identity through same-sex
relationships-and religious objections to the public, relational component of
lesbian and gay identity-that is primarily at stake. In other words, the current
debate neglects both the existence and the implications of the relevant identity
claims. This Part first explains how sexual orientation identity includes a
relational component. It then demonstrates that the conflict between same-sex
marriage and religious exemptions centers on that relational component, rather
than on marriage. Understanding the centrality of same-sex relationships, rather
than same-sex marriages, suggests the importance of the relationship-inclusive
antidiscrimination regime set out in Part III.
A. Sexual Orientation as Relational Identity
The commentary on same-sex marriage and religious objections obscures
a core element of how sexual orientation discrimination operates and neglects a
key feature of religious objections to sexual orientation nondiscrimination.
Marriage equality represents merely one instantiation of relationship-based
sexual orientation equality. And objections to marriage equality serve largely as
a subset of broader religious objections to sexual orientation equality.
The concept of public, relational identity offers a productive theoretical
lens through which to elaborate this argument and thereby analyze conflicts
between sexual orientation nondiscrimination and a religiously motivated
desire to discriminate against same-sex relationships. More specifically,
Professor Kenji Yoshino's theory of covering and performative identity helps
to explain how sexual orientation is, at its core, a conduct-based, relational
identity.89 In his work on identity and antidiscrimination, Yoshino explains that
covering occurs when an individual who does not otherwise alter or hide her
identity nonetheless downplays that identity;90 in other words, she minimizes
the attributes or acts that are salient to that identity.91 Understanding covering,
therefore, requires understanding how acts can partly constitute identities. To
show this, Yoshino adapts Professor Judith Butler's work to conceptualize what
he terms a "weak performative model," which "suggests that identity has a
performative aspect, such that one's identity will be formed in part through
one's acts and social situation.'
92
89. See KENJI YosHiNO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006);
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
90. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 772.
91. See id. at 924 ("For orientation,... covering applies to orientation-salient conduct such as
sodomy.").
92. Id. at 871 (emphasis omitted). See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2d. ed. 1999); see also Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VI1, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 117-82
(applying Butler's performativity model to racial and ethnic identity).
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Yoshino uses sexual orientation to demonstrate the relationship between
covering demands and a performative model of identity, though he ultimately
applies the covering concept to race and sex as well.93 He argues that
"homosexual self-identification and homosexual conduct are sufficiently
central to gay identity that burdening such acts is tantamount to burdening gay
status. 9 4 When focusing on the varying ways in which acts can constitute
sexual orientation identity, Yoshino includes same-sex sex as a key element
95
and links same-sex relationships to same-sex sex.96 By appearing single,
lesbians and gay men can "prevent others from visualizing same-sex sexual
activity."97 Indeed, Yoshino notes that this might explain the relative
invisibility of same-sex couples compared to the increasing visibility of lesbian
and gay individuals.
98
Yoshino applies the concept of covering to argue for a more robust
antidiscrimination framework. He is careful, however, not to argue that every
act that relates to identity is constitutive and thus merits protection under
antidiscrimination law.99 Indeed, some identities are much more performative
than others.'00 In his model, then, "certain acts of covering are constitutive in a
way that other acts are not. The content of this category of 'constitutive'
covering will differ for every identity .... ,101
My focus on public relationships builds on Yoshino's concept, but has a
sexual orientation specificity that Yoshino, in the end, resists.' °2 Sexual
93. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 781 (arguing that "some forms of race-based covering
(such as muting linguistic difference) or sex-based covering (such as muting a pregnancy) might also
be constitutive of identity").
94. Id. at 778.
95. Id. at 781 (maintaining that "certain acts denominated as covering, such as abstention
from same-sex sodomy, might be constitutive of gay identity").
96. Commenting on Yoshino's theory of covering, Professor Russell Robinson provides
further evidence of the link between sexual orientation and same-sex relationships. See Russell K.
Robinson, Uncovering COVERING, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) ("My frustration surfaced
regularly in conversations with my parents because I did not feel free to share with them the gay-
related aspects of my life. Thus, they did not hear how I fell in love for the first time, how my partner
was planning to move to Los Angeles to be with me, or how ultimately the relationship ended in
sorrow.").
97. Yoshino, supra note 89, at 847. Professor Marc Fajer has made a similar point,
explaining that "the crucial element to hide is usually one's sexual and romantic relationships." Marc
A. Fajer, A Better Analogy: "Jews, " "Homosexuals, " and the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation as a
Forbidden Characteristic in Antidiscrimination Laws, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 37, 46 (2001).
98. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 847.
99. See id. at 873 ("To say that identities have both performative and constative dimensions,
however, simply begs another question-how much of a particular identity is performatively
constituted? The answer to that question will depend on the identity.").
100. See id. at 873 ("1 would hypothesize that if individuals were asked to order religion,
orientation, race, and sex along a continuum from most to least performative, they would array them in
the sequence just given.").
101. Id.at874.
102 See Robinson, supra note 96, at 1814 (criticizing Yoshino's universalist turn). One might
object that a relationship discrimination regime that focuses on same-sex relationships and
2012] 1197
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
orientation by its very nature includes an active, relational component. 103
Sexual orientation identity is linked to (both actual and contemplated)
relationships with other bodies.' °4 That is, sexual orientation is defined in terms
of the sex of the object of desire.' 05 As Professor Holning Lau explains in
arguing for an antidiscrimination regime that includes same-sex couples qua
couples, "one's sexual orientation is necessarily relational. Although an
individual's sexual interests are internal, those interests are directed at the
external: other individuals."' 0 6 Similarly, Professor Janet Halley notes that
"[o]ne is a lesbian not because of anything in oneself, but because of social
interactions, or the desire for social interactions ....,,07 Put more succinctly,
according to Halley, "it takes two women, or at least one woman and the
imagination of another, to make a lesbian."' 1 8 Therefore, as Professor Mary
conceptualizes relationship discrimination within the rubric of sexual orientation does not go far
enough, failing to address how a variety of nonnormative relationships suffer discrimination. A more
comprehensive relationship discrimination regime might allow us to capture, through one lens,
discrimination against cohabiting different-sex couples, interracial couples, and same-sex couples.
Conceptualizing relationship discrimination more broadly would recognize the way in which the
discrimination stems largely from deviation from the normative family, which is heavily influenced by
class, race, sex, and sexual orientation dimensions. But collapsing same-sex relationships with other
relationships would, for my purposes, lose the specificity of sexual orientation and neglect the unique
tie between relationships and identity in the sexual orientation context. Reconceptualizing the state's
relationship to families is an important project, but it is different in kind from the project undertaken
here. See generally POLIKOFF, supra note 23.
103. I am using "relational" in a particular way here. I do not mean "relational" as a comment
on the minoritizing construction of subordinated groups. In such an alternative understanding, the
identity exists and is defined in relation to a privileged identity category. For instance, racial minority
categories are defined against and subordinated in relation to whiteness. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 873, 886 (2006). And the notion of gay identity constitutes the
heterosexuality/homosexuality divide that invests the former with power and makes possible the
subordination of the latter. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (1993). Here I am instead referring simply to a
relationship between individuals.
104. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out ": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions ofLiberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411,
2417 (1997) ("Sexual orientation involves both thought and action; a typical lesbian feels erotic
attraction or strong emotional bonds to other women and engages in sexual and social activities with
other women."). I do not mean to oversimplify or essentialize the relationship between sexual
orientation identity and sexual acts. The boundaries between acts (sodomy) and identity
(homosexuality) are much more porous than popular imagination and constitutional discourse have
acknowledged. See Halley, supra note 103, at 1734-40.
105. Honing Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2006) (arguing that "one's sexual orientation
classification is necessarily defined by whom she desires to partner with"); see also Mary Anne Case,
Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History ofLitigatingfor Lesbian
and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1993) (explaining that "[miany of the traditional
dichotomies that plague gay rights litigation meet and break down in the gay couple").
106. Lau, supra note 105, at 1286 (footnote omitted).
107. Janet E. Halley, "Like Race" Arguments, in WHAT'S LEFT OF TH{EORY? NEW WORK ON
THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY 40, 41 (Judith Butler et al. eds., 2000).
108. Id; see also Case, supra note 105, at 1650.
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Anne Case concludes, "it seems, almost definitionally, coupling or the desire to
couple must figure in same-sex orientation."
10 9
The relational element that Lau, Halley, and Case observe underscores the
conduct-based component of sexual orientation.110 Conduct, in the form of
same-sex relationships, enacts lesbian or gay identity.' Entering, performing,
and publicly showing a same-sex relationship serves as a central way of
embracing and maintaining one's lesbian or gay identity. This goes beyond the
idea that intimate relationships are important to selfhood and identity, instead
explicitly linking a certain type of relationship to a specific identity."12 Same-
sex relationships, in this sense, publicly enact lesbian and gay identity. Indeed,
for purposes of both marriage and antidiscrimination law, the public aspect of
same-sex relationships is especially important, revealing one's lesbian and gay
identity to potential discriminators and threatening entrenched norms in a way
that purely private relationships do not.' 
13
B. Uncovering Same-Sex Relationships
Scholars and advocates intervening in the current marriage debate tend to
rely on disputes regarding same-sex relationships outside the marriage context
109. Case, supra note 105, at 1650.
110. Of course, the categories of desire, behavior, and identity are not interchangeable, but
those individuals who identify as lesbian or gay generally report same-sex desire and behavior. See
EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY 299 fig.8.2 (1994).
111. In the custody context, courts have historically distinguished between lesbian and gay
parents' sexual orientation and their sexual orientation-based conduct, tolerating the status as a general
matter yet rejecting or curtailing the parents' ability to live out that status by, for instance, having an
open same-sex relationship. See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood,
and the Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 257, 270 (2009).
112. While making a distinct argument, this point takes cues from scholarship linking
relationships to selthood. Professor Kenneth Karst's work is most central. See Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980) ("Transient or enduring, chosen or
not, our intimate associations profoundly affect our personalities and our senses of self. When they are
chosen, they take on expressive dimensions as statements defining ourselves."). Professor Bryan Fair
ties Karst's work on intimate association to marriage for same-sex couples. See Bryan K. Fair, The
Ultimate Association: Same-Sex Marriage and the Battle Against Jim Crow's Other Cousin, 63 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 269, 290-97 (2008). In the housing context, Professor Marie Failinger argues that
marital status discrimination is harmful largely because "an individual's very selfhood is partially
constituted in relationship-where people may experience the best of who they are with another ... "
Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between
Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 383, 398 (2001).
113. See Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the
Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3, 4 (2008) ("When same-sex
couples choose to be visible, their presence challenges a number of social norms, and sometimes legal
norms as well, with regard to sex, gender, and sexual orientation, as well as the status of that couple
and other same-sex couples."). While some religious liberty scholars understand same-sex couples'
claim to marriage as public because, as Berg puts it, "it involves positive govemment benefits
associated with marriage," I am focusing instead on the way in which same-sex relationships often
enact lesbian and gay identity in a public, rather than purely private, way, regardless of government
recognition or benefits. See Berg, supra note 13, at 217. Indeed, this point suggests that the debate over
marriage implicates issues around outness more generally.
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to make claims about the effects of same-sex marriage on religious objectors.
Even if their appeal to nonmarital same-sex relationships is understandable,
given that marriage for same-sex couples is a recent reality, it underscores the
breadth of the issue actually being addressed and points toward origins of the
conflict beyond those currently contemplated. Indeed, their reliance on
situations involving nonmarital same-sex relationships runs counter to their
narrow focus on marriage and suggests that they recognize, at least implicitly,
the central importance of the relational component of sexual orientation. The
crux of the conflict centers on the public, relationship-based enactment of
sexual orientation rather than on same-sex marriage per se. Religious
objections are rooted most often not in marriage alone, but in the facilitation
and recognition of same-sex relationships. In other words, the objection
animating opposition to same-sex marriage relates primarily to the enactment
of sexual orientation itself rather than the form such enactment takes.
Professor Wilson, who is one of the most prolific scholars on the topic,
argues that "[i]t is likely that a stream of litigation is on the horizon designed to
resolve competing claims of individuals who want to enter same-sex marriage
and those who want to have nothing to do with facilitating this."' 14 In this
account, same-sex marriage constitutes the primary threat to religious freedom
in the domain of sexual orientation. And yet, in making her argument, Wilson
relies not on the effects of same-sex marriage, but on disputes that encompass
nonmarital same-sex relationships-some not even recognized by the state-
and adoption by same-sex couples.' 15 Similarly, Marc Stem purports to limit
his discussion "to those cases in which the law requires an institution or a
person to act in ways that are reasonably understood to relate to the same-sex
marriage itself-for instance, by renting an apartment to the couple or
providing family benefits' to a same-sex couple."' 16 His discussion, by its very
terms, is not limited to marriage; instead, it explicitly implicates same-sex
relationships more broadly. Clearly, one need not be married to live together,
regardless of sexual orientation. Similarly, the multitude of domestic
partnership laws extending benefits to same-sex couples demonstrates that
benefits cases are not limited to marriage either. That Stem proposes a
legislative carve-out as part of marriage equality legislation in many ways
defies the far-reaching relationship-based concerns he highlights." 
7
To make their case for religious exemptions in marriage equality
legislation, scholars typically deploy two high-profile lawsuits that pit gay
rights against religious freedom. Neither case, however, implicates marriage for
114. See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 80.
115. Id.at78.
116. Stem, supra note 72, at 25 (emphasis added).
117. See id. at 57 ("If there is to be space for opponents of same-sex marriage, it will have to




same-sex couples. Instead, both highlight the public, relationship-based feature
of sexual orientation discrimination and the importance of existing
antidiscrimination law, thereby demonstrating commentators' misplaced
emphasis on marriage. The first comes from New Mexico, a state with a sexual
orientation nondiscrimination law but no relationship recognition regime for
same-sex couples.' 18 The second emerges from New Jersey, a state with a civil
union regime (but no marriage recognition) and an antidiscrimination law that
includes both sexual orientation and civil union status.' 
1 9
In Willock v. Elane Photography, a photographer, based on her religious
beliefs, refused to photograph a same-sex couple's commitment ceremony.120
The couple sued under New Mexico's public accommodations
antidiscrimination law. The state Human Rights Commission found in their
favor,121 and the state courts affirmed that ruling.122 Religious liberty scholars
frequently appeal to this case in arguing for religious exemptions in legislation
recognizing marriage for same-sex couples. 123 And activists opposed to
marriage for same-sex couples cite the case as an illustration of the grave threat
to religious freedom-and specifically to small business owners-posed by
marriage equality. For example, the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), the
Christian legal organization that represented the photographer in the case,
highlighted the New Mexico controversy during the lead-up to the passage of
California's Proposition 8, the state constitutional amendment eliminating
same-sex couples' right to marry.' 24 ADF did so despite the fact that California
already had a comprehensive domestic partnership regime and a state
antidiscrimination law that included sexual orientation. 125 It makes little sense,
as a matter of law, to think that the New Mexico case illustrates a problem that
California would newly confront if it allowed same-sex couples to marry; New
Mexico does not offer any relationship recognition to same-sex couples, let
alone marriage. It was the existence of the antidiscrimination law-not the
118. N.M. STAT. ANN § 28-1-7 (West 2011).
119. N.J. STAT. § 37:1-28 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§10:5-1 to 10:5-49 (West 2012).
120. HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 (N.M. Hum. Rts. Comm'n Apr. 9, 2008).
121. See id.
122. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632 (D.N.M. Dec. 11, 2009), affd,
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. 30,203 (N.M. Ct. App. May 31, 2012).
123. See, e.g., Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 78; Berg, supra note 13, at
229; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Protecting Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012, 10:57 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/29/are-religion-and-marriage-indivisible/same-sex-
marriage-protecting-religious-liberty; Robin Wilson, Protection for All in Same-Sex Marriage, L.A.
TIMES, May 3, 2009, at A39 [hereinafter Wilson, Protection for All in Same-Sex Marriage]; Berg et
al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 2.
124. See Talk of the Nation, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (June 16, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.phpprgld=5&prgDate=6-16-2008 (quoting Jordan
Lorence, ADF senior counsel, discussing the impact of the New Mexico case during a discussion
framed around marriage for same-sex couples in California).
125. See CAL. FAM. CODE §297.5 (Deering 2011); CAL. CV. CODE §51 (Deering 2011).
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nature of the commitment ceremony-that allowed the case to go forward in
New Mexico.
In Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, the New Jersey
Department of Law and Public Safety Division on Civil Rights found probable
cause to credit the allegations of a complaint that a nonprofit ministry
organization unlawfully refused to permit a civil union ceremony on a
beachfront boardwalk pavilion open to all others for various events and
ceremonies. 26 The Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association is a Methodist
organization whose mission is "to provide opportunities for spiritual birth,
growth and renewal through worship, education, cultural and recreational
programs for persons of all ages in a Christian seaside setting." 127 The
Association consistently rented its facility for Christian, non-Christian, and
secular weddings, as well as for a host of other secular events, including
fundraisers, musical performances, and meetings.128 Since the pavilion was
open for public use, based on both actual practice and the earlier
representations of the Association itself, the Division on Civil Rights found that
the facility was a public accommodation, and that under the state's
antidiscrimination regime, the Association could not therefore discriminate
between different-sex wedding ceremonies and same-sex civil union
ceremonies. 129 An Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed with the
Division on Civil Rights.1 30 Again, scholars and advocates consistently point to
this case in calling for religious accommodations in marriage equality
legislation. 131
These on-the-ground examples, however, do not demonstrate the unique
threat of marriage equality. 132 Instead, they undermine the exceptional
treatment of marriage and point to the public, relational enactment of sexual
orientation identity actually at stake-and to the importance of handling
conflicts between same-sex couples and religious objectors in the domain of
antidiscrimination law. Both Willock and Bernstein involved nonmarital same-
sex relationships. In both cases, objections arose in response to the same-sex
relationship, regardless of marriage. 33 And, in both cases, the courts applied
existing antidiscrimination protections.
126. No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety Dec. 29, 2008).
127. See id. at 2.
128. See id. at 3.
129. See id. at 3-4, 7, 9.
130. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, O.A.L. Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09, at 7
(Jan. 12, 2012).
131. See, e.g., Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 78; Jill P. Capuzzo, Group
Loses Tax Break over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TtMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at B2; Berg et al., Conn. Letter,
supra note 16, at 2.
132. See Flynn, supra note 13, at 247 (observing that the clashes cited by religious liberty
scholars and advocates "typically do not involve marriage at all").
133. Indeed, the record in Bernstein demonstrates that the organization rejected the application
to rent its space because "the notion of civil union conflicted with scriptural teaching regarding
1202 [Vol. 100: 1169
MARRIAGE INEQUALITY
Furthermore, even when scholars look to a state with marriage for same-
sex couples, they point to disputes implicating same-sex relationships more
generally, rather than marriages of same-sex couples specifically. In
Massachusetts, the first state to recognize marriage for same-sex couples
(having done so almost five years before any other state), the conflicts raised by
scholars generally do not hinge on marriage recognition.' 34 In the first such
dispute, which did not produce litigation, Catholic Charities refused to facilitate
adoptions by same-sex couples, a practice the state deemed violative of its
antidiscrimination law.' 35 When Catholic Charities refused to permit such
adoptions and the state refused to provide a religious exemption, Catholic
Charities removed itself from the Massachusetts adoption business
altogether. 136  In the more recent controversy, parents in Lexington,
Massachusetts, objected to their school district's gay-inclusive elementary
school curriculum.' 37 The curriculum included a children's book depicting a
marriage between two princes,138 as well as texts showing same-sex-couple-
headed families as part of instruction on family diversity.' 39 Both the federal
homosexuality... ." Bernstein, O.A.L. Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09, at 2-3 (emphasis added). To some
extent, Wilson acknowledges the breadth of the issue. In her writing on Proposition 8 in California, she
notes that "[t]ensions over same-sex relationships have erupted across the world and the United States
as more and more governments have recognized not just same-sex marriage but civil unions and same-
sex adoptions." Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Life After Prop 8,
14 NEXUS 101, 102 (2009). Nonetheless, Wilson focuses on disputes arising out of state recognition
of same-sex relationships, either through relationship recognition laws or state-sanctioned adoption,
rather than out of the ordinary enactment of sexual orientation through same-sex relationships,
regardless of formal status. Id (noting that because California recognizes nonmarital same-sex
relationships, allows same-sex adoption, and bans discrimination in places of public accommodation,
regardless of Proposition 8, Californians "will have to navigate a rising tide of moral clashes over
same-sex relationships").
134. This is not to say that the recognition of marriage for same-sex couples would not
increase pressure on objecting religious groups. Not only would marriage recognition deprive such
groups of marital-status-based arguments supporting discrimination against same-sex couples, but it
would also further normalize same-sex relationships and entrench legal, social, and cultural norms of
sexual orientation equality. See Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J.
663, 714 (2012) (charting the relationship between successful legal mobilization and the mainstream-
ing of equality for same-sex couples).
135. See Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adoption in Massachusetts, the Catholic Church, and the
Good of the Children: The Story Behind the Controversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27
CHILD. LEGAL RTs. J., Fall 2007, at 1, 1. For scholars' and advocates' use of this example in the same-
sex marriage debate, see Gallagher, Banned in Boston, supra note 13; Wilson, Protection for All in
Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 123.
136. See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
11, 2006, at Al. More recently, after initiating civil unions, Illinois terminated its foster-care and
adoption contracts with Catholic Charities, based on Catholic Charities' refusal to place children with
same-sex couples. The civil union law in Illinois prompted the dispute, since Catholic Charities had
previously been allowed to discriminate against same-sex couples. See Dave McKinney & Mitch
Dudek, Foster-Care Contracts Cut, CH. SUN-TIMES, July 12, 2011, at 17.
137. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008).




district court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the parents'
parental rights and free exercise claims. 1
40
Both cases implicated same-sex couples rather than merely same-sex
marriage. In the Catholic Charities dispute, same-sex marriage was peripheral
to both the religious objection and to the state's construction of its
antidiscrimination law. Indeed, the issue predated Massachusetts's recognition
of same-sex couples' marriages.141 In the Lexington case, the school included
depictions of both married and unmarried same-sex couples, and the parents
objected to all such depictions.
To their credit, scholars arguing for exemptions in the same-sex marriage
context have at times acknowledged the tension between their focus on
marriage and the examples used to make their case. Professor Berg, for
instance, notes that "the adoption and photographer cases arose independent of
efforts to legalize gay marriage; they arose under preexisting laws against
sexual-orientation discrimination. ' 142 And Professor Laycock admits that
conflicts would persist in the absence of state-sanctioned marriage for same-sex
couples. 143 Yet they continue to push for exemptions in the specific context of
marriage.
Even if marriage recognition produces significant new examples of sexual
orientation discrimination, the underlying stakes-for both same-sex couples
and religious objectors-relate primarily to same-sex relationships and
religious objections to those relationships. While I appreciate the way in which
marriage may heighten the threat to religious objectors, by both increasing the
use of antidiscrimination law to protect same-sex couples and further
entrenching a norm of lesbian and gay equality, analysis of the examples
deployed in the debate over marriage equality and religious liberty exposes a
significant flaw in the current discourse. The examples demonstrate that the
conflict between sexual orientation nondiscrimination and religious objections
largely centers on same-sex relationships, rather than same-sex marriage per se.
Accordingly, in order to account for the actual interests on both sides of the
debate, a more robust conversation centered on same-sex relationships must
occur in antidiscrimination law.
140. See id. at 90, 107. The Massachusetts litigation regarding school instruction became a
centerpiece of the campaign to pass Proposition 8-and thereby eliminate the right to marry for same-
sex couples-in California. See Murray, supra note 9, at 372-85; Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through
Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 1008-10 (2011).
141. See Avila, supra note 135, at 9 (explaining legislative and administrative developments in
the mid-1990s that led to same-sex adoption in Massachusetts).
142. See Berg, supra note 13, at 207; see also Thomas C. Berg, Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Liberty, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 16, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com
2011/08/me-sex-marriage-and-religious-liberty/ (last visited June 17, 2012).
143. In proposing that the state remove itself from the marriage business by licensing only
civil unions, Laycock nonetheless appreciates that same-sex couples who want religious ceremonies
"may still encounter a merchant from a different faith who doesn't want to provide goods or services




COVERING SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN SEXUAL ORIENTATION
ANTIDISCRMINATION LAW
Despite the way in which sexual orientation includes an active, relational
component-and that religious objections to sexual orientation equality are
increasingly targeting same-sex couples, rather than lesbian and gay
individuals-the legal system has responded in inconsistent and problematic
ways. Historically, statutory and constitutional antidiscrimination law largely
has taken an approach that disaggregates the relational element-same-sex
relationships-from a more static and individualistic understanding of sexual
orientation identity. 44 Because of this, discrimination against same-sex couples
was rarely challenged, and when it was, lesbian and gay plaintiffs experienced
a number of setbacks. 145 Yet recent developments suggest reason for hope that
antidiscrimination law will ultimately arrive at a more robust model of sexual
orientation nondiscrimination. This Part details the shortcomings of
antidiscrimination law and then points to emerging trends that suggest that an
antidiscrimination regime that more consistently and coherently includes same-
sex relationships may be on the horizon.
144. Interracial coupling presents a situation in which relationality around race may trigger
discrimination, but it does so in ways that are distinguishable from the discrimination against same-sex
couples addressed here. First, the basis of the discrimination may relate to invidious notions of racial
superiority that rely on the relationship between different racial categories. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). With same-sex couples, on the other hand, the sexual orientation-based identity
manifests itself in a coupling in which both members embody the disfavored identity. Discrimination
against same-sex couples, then, may be more akin to discrimination against intraracial couples.
Second, as Professors Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Jacob Willig-Onwuachi argue, the dynamics of
interracial coupling itself may trigger discrimination. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-
Onwuachi, A House Divided: The Invisibility of the Multiracial Family, 44 H-ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
231, 249 (2009). And yet the law often fails to recognize the distinct harms visited upon multiracial
families. See id. at 244-45. Despite some important similarities, this situation is again distinguishable
from discrimination against same-sex couples. In explaining the harms of discrimination against
interracial couples, Onwuachi-Willig and Willig-Onwuachi argue that "[s]uch discrimination concerns
more than pure race discrimination as it is based on the collective, not the individual. Specifically, it is
based on interraciality and the particular stereotypes targeted at people who together intimately cross
racial boundaries." Id. at 252. Yet for same-sex couples, I argue that the discrimination is based more
straightforwardly on sexual orientation, thus not requiring any additional category in antidiscrimination
law. Cf id. at 252 (suggesting the addition of "interraciality" to housing nondiscrimination laws).
Nonetheless, Onwuachi-Willig and Willig-Onwuachi's push for antidiscrimination law to reflect a
more dynamic and collective understanding of discrimination finds common ground with my project
and would do significant work toward remedying discrimination against both interracial couples and
same-sex couples. Onwuachi-Willig herself provides a thoughtfil analysis of the similarities between
interracial and same-sex coupling relative to the concept of passing. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note
103, at 897-99.
145. While the following discussion suggests a steady trajectory toward more favorable
treatment of same-sex couples, it is important to note at the outset that early attempts to invoke
antidiscrimination protections on behalf of same-sex couples were not entirely unsuccessful. See Rolon
v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289 (1984) (reversing the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by
a lesbian couple denied a semiprivate booth at a restaurant).
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A. The Individualistic Focus ofAntidiscrimination Law
Antidiscrimination law, both as a constitutional and statutory matter,
generally takes as its subject the individual. 146 Rather than depend on group-
based discrimination, the paradigmatic scenario involves a public or private
actor treating an individual differently based on a protected trait. 147 With its
liberal preoccupation with the individual, antidiscrimination law, especially in
light of the more recent formalist turn, tends to isolate the victim of
discrimination and the alleged wrongdoer rather than locate discrimination
within broader structural patterns of subordination. 148 Indeed, disparate-impact
theory, which involves greater consideration of group-based effects of
purportedly neutral policies,149 has experienced a serious decline since its
146. See Lau, supra note 105, at 1292 (describing antidiscrimination law's "individualist
paradigm,.., in which rights are accorded only to individuals and individuals are the analytical units
among which discrimination is proscribed"); see also Adeno Addis, Individualism,
Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1219, 1234-39
(1991) (exploring the limitations of "the individualist perspective" for the recognition of group-based
cultural rights); David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J.
240, 258 (2004) (noting that "as a descriptive matter, our equality doctrines are individual and anti-
classificationist"); Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 144, at 251-52 (criticizing
housing discrimination law for tracking the individualistic sensibilities of employment discrimination
law).
147. See, e.g., DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS
POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 84 (2011) ("[Discrimination law] individualizes racism. It says
that racism is about bad individuals who intentionally make discriminatory choices and must be
punished. In this (mis)understanding, structural or systemic racism is rendered invisible."); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1297 (2000)
("Antidiscrimination law places the following question at the center of any claim of discrinatory
treatment: Was there intentional discrimination based on the plaintiffs membership in a protected
class, such as race, gender, or disability?").
148. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1291-92 (2011) [hereinafter Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization] (charting the move away from the "antisubordination" principle
in equality jurisprudence); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARv. L. REv. 494, 553 (2003) ("In the prevailing equality jurisprudence, the prohibition of
deliberate discrimination sounds chiefly in individualism. The judicially enforced conception of equal
protection, which is limited to a concern with intentional discrimination, is repeatedly described as
pertaining to individuals rather than groups.") (footnotes omitted); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1111, 1130 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects] (arguing that
"doctrines concerning discriminatory purpose authorize certain forms of state action that perpetuate
racial stratification as consistent with constitutional guarantees of equal protection"). The
individualistic perspective generally correlates with the "anticlassification" or "antidifferentiation,"
rather than the "antisubordination," view of antidiscrimination law. See Siegel, From Colorblindness
to Antibalkanization, supra, at 1287; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1005 (1986). Professor Siegel articulates a third view
detectable in the decisions of the Court's swing Justices, which she labels antibalkanization, and which
is capable of a concern with group-based marginalization. See Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization, supra, at 1351-52.
149. See Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 148, at 1317 ("The
disparate impact claim is designed to . . . challenge structural discrimination--discrimination that
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inception. By looking with tunnel vision for purposeful discrimination aimed
at an identifiable victim, courts interpreting antidiscrimination law often fail to
appreciate the gravity and pervasiveness of discrimination.1
Moreover, as a matter of both statutory language and judicial application,
antidiscrimination law often employs a one-dimensional, static view. Critical
Race scholars have argued that by focusing on a single axis of discrimination,
courts are often unable to remedy the harms experienced by individuals with
multiple markers of minority status. 52  Rather than appreciate the
multidimensional nature of discrimination and the dynamic interaction of
various identity traits, courts generally demand a specific injury linked to
discrimination based on a specific trait.153 As Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw
argues in her work on intersectionality, "focus on the most privileged group
members marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims
that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of
arises from the interaction of workplace criteria with other race-salient social practices."); see also
Primus, supra note 148, at 554-55.
150. See Primus, supra note 148, at 498 (arguing that equal protection has "become more
individualistic, more formal, and less concerned with history and social structure") (footnotes omitted).
According to Siegel's analysis, as debates in antidiscrimination came to focus on disparate impact,
justificatory rhetoric around discriminatory purpose limited disparate-impact law under constitutional
equal protection principles and thereby perpetuated traditional status hierarchies. See Siegel, Why
Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 148, at 1131-39. In the Title VII context, disparate-
impact theory more recently has been severely limited. See Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization, supra note 148, at 1320-22. For analysis on the question of whether the Supreme
Court might eventually hold that statutory disparate-impact standards violate constitutional principles
of equal protection, see Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341
(2010). As Professor Primus observes, "[t]hat the question is being asked at all represents a complete
turnabout in antidiscrimination law." Id. at 1343. Primus himself foreshadowed this conflict in an
earlier article, noting that "[t]he idea that equal protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of
statutory disparate impact standards departs significantly from settled ways of thinking about
antidiscrimination !aw." Primus, supra note 148, at 495.
151. Professor Alan David Freeman's critical analysis of the "perpetrator perspective" in
antidiscrimination law is instructive: "The perpetrator perspective presupposes a world composed of
atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart from the social fabric and without
historical continuity. From this perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a social
phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors." Alan David Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1054 (1978) (footnote omitted).
152. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 374 (arguing that "cases arising under employment discrimination
statutes . . . demonstrate the absence of any consideration of either race-sex interaction or the
stereotyping of black womanhood"); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece:
Exploring New Strands ofAnalysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1086 (2010).
153. See Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989) (identifying "the tendency to treat race and gender as mutually
exclusive categories of experience and analysis," Crenshaw "examine[s] how this tendency is
perpetuated by a single-axis framework that is dominant in antidiscrimination law"); see also id. at
141-48 (explaining the multiple doctrinal failures by courts addressing discrimination against black
women).
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discrimination."' 154 Accordingly, Crenshaw concludes that antidiscrimination
law's "single-axis framework erases Black women in the conceptualization,
identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination ..." 155
Professors Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Jacob Willig-Onwuachi take the
insights of intersectionality to family relationships, arguing that the
individualistic, single-axis view reflected in most interpretations of statutory
antidiscrimination law obscures the unique harms experienced by interracial
couples and their families; "the intersection of race and family" may give rise
to discrimination in ways that "a single identity category" cannot capture.' 56
Furthermore, the static perspective on discrimination that courts generally
use to interpret and apply antidiscrimination law leaves discrimination against
conduct-based enactment of identity largely unaddressed.1 57 Adverse treatment
directed at the individual's conduct-for instance, language-may nonetheless
target the individual based on her status-for instance, national origin or
ethnicity. 5 8 Yet courts often distinguish the latter (actionable) form of
discrimination from the former (unactionable) form.' 59 Even when the law
acknowledges the link between identity and performance, as it does in the
context of sex-stereotype discrimination,' courts have failed to follow this
approach to its logical conclusion.' Rather than recognize the burdens
154. Id. at 140. For a discussion of how courts' requirement of a comparator for discrimination
claims renders intersectional claims especially difficult, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 764-66 (2011).
155. See Crenshaw, supra note 153, at 140; see also Kimberd Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991).
156. Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 144, at 238. For an approach that
argues that intersectionality relies on "autonomic categories," see Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the
Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1263 (1997). For a summary of cases addressing
relational discrimination under Title VII in the context of interracial relationships, see Victoria
Schwartz, Title VII: A Shifi rom Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 209,216-32 (2012).
157. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 147, at 1262-63 ("[T]o the extent that
antidiscrimination law ignores identity work, it will not be able to address 'racial conduct'
discrimination. Racial conduct discrimination derives, not simply from the fact that an employee is, for
example, phenotypically Asian-American (i.e., her racial status) but also from how she performs her
Asian-American identity in the workplace (i.e., her racial conduct)."); Gear Rich, supra note 92, at
1203 (noting that "[courts] have concluded that Title VII protects only against 'status'-based
discrimination and is not concerned with discrimination triggered by 'conduct'); see also SPADE,
supra note 147, at 109.
158. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 836 (1994).
159. See id. at 827-28; see also Gear Rich, supra note 92, at 1213-14. For analysis of how the
judicial focus on comparators obscures the operation of discrimination in identity performance cases,
see Goldberg, supra note 154, at 766-70.
160. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (holding that
discrimination against an employee for failure to conform to sex stereotypes may form the basis of an
actionable Title VII sex-discrimination claim).
161. Interestingly, the law reflects more awareness of the performative nature of identity in the
context of religion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006) (defining "religion" as including "all aspects of
religious observance and practice"); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270
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imposed by sex-differentiated dress codes, courts have upheld such policies. 162
And instead of contemplating the connection between gender-based expression
and sexual orientation identity, courts have rejected lesbian and gay employees'
claims that they were subject to discrimination for their failure to conform to
sex stereotypes.
163
The individualistic and static tendencies that characterize
antidiscrimination law pose unique problems in the domain of sexual
orientation. Statutory (and, to a lesser extent, constitutional) antidiscrimination
law traditionally has approached an individual's sexual orientation as a static,
one-dimensional identity. The law purports to protect the individual against
adverse treatment based on lesbian or gay status, but in practice has provided
little protection from adverse treatment directed at conduct that constitutes the
status. Therefore, same-sex relationships, which move beyond the
individualistic lens of antidiscrimination law and implicate an active (rather
than static) conceptualization of identity, historically have struggled to find
coverage in the law. On one hand, many states protect lesbians and gay men
from discrimination in public accommodations, employment, and housing. Yet
on the other hand, some of these same states prohibit the legal recognition of
same-sex relationships and carve out, either implicitly or explicitly,
relationship-based protections from antidiscrimination provisions.'64
Employment nondiscrimination mandates provide an illuminating
example.' 65 State laws that prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation generally prohibit an employer from using an individual's sexual
orientation as a basis for refusing to hire, firing, passing over for promotion, or
(1993) (observing that targeting certain activities may target certain classes of people, for example,
"[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews").
162. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that while appearance standards may form the basis of a Title VII claim for impermissible sex
stereotyping, plaintiff did not have an actionable claim based on her employer's sex-differentiated
grooming policy).
163. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221-23 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that gender nonconforming lesbian employee failed to state Title VHI claim).
164. See, for instance, the state of the law in Minnesota, as discussed below. See infra notes
171-172 and accompanying text. The state maintains a sexual orientation antidiscrimination law, but
this law has been interpreted so as not to require equal treatment of same-sex couples in employment.
And the state currently offers no relationship recognition to same-sex couples.
165. In the public accommodations context, Lau argues that because one's "coupling
preference" reveals one's sexual orientation identity, and thereby enacts sexual orientation in the
public sphere, the law should protect "couples' aggregate right to access business establishments-
instead of focusing on individuals' right of access." Lau, supra note 105, at 1279. Lau's position is
consistent with calls made by both Yoshino and Fajer for a more robust antidiscrimination regime
based on the expressive aspects of identity. See Fajer, supra note 97, at 48 (arguing that
antidiscrimination law's preoccupation with static notions of status offers "little protection for public
expression of identity"); Yoshino, supra note 89, at 873 ("Under a weak performative model, one
cannot simply assume that covering is not a serious demand. One must instead ask whether a
commitment against status discrimination might require us to prohibit discrimination against an act
constitutive of that status.").
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discriminating in compensation or the terms of employment.1 66 Legislators and
courts, however, generally have not interpreted such laws to compel
employers-absent comprehensive relationship recognition under state law-to
treat employees' same-sex relationships like the employer treats (married)
different-sex relationships.'1 67  Therefore, employment nondiscrimination
provisions largely have not been read to require healthcare benefits for the
families of lesbian and gay employees, even though such benefits constitute a
key component of employee compensation.'
68
For instance, the Boston-based legal organization Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) has explained to constituents that state
employment nondiscrimination laws would likely not be interpreted to require
domestic partner benefits. According to GLAD:
Although the anti-discrimination law says that an employer cannot
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in terms of
compensation, and even though employee benefits are a form of
compensation, in many, if not most circumstances, that law probably
cannot be used to compel an employer to provide benefits to an
. 169
employee's same-sex partner.
Aware of the reluctance to extend rights to same-sex couples in the
employment domain and careful to avoid the creation of negative precedent,
GLAD has advised its constituents to accept the individualistic understanding
of antidiscrimination protections and to resist legal challenges to that
understanding. In this way, a lack of case law-and the shared understanding of
the limits of antidiscrimination law, especially in light of a discriminatory
marriage regime-bolsters the individualistic focus of sexual orientation
nondiscrimination mandates.
166. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (Deering 2011).
167. Strikingly, Nevada's comprehensive domestic partnership law explicitly provides that it
"do[es] not require a public or private employer ... to provide health care benefits to or for the
domestic partner of an officer or employee." NEv. REv. STAT. § 122A.210 (2009).
168. See Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace
Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMPLE POL. & CIVTL RTS. L. REv. 337,
342 (1998) ("Employee benefits comprise an increasing percentage of the compensation packages of
full-time workers, due in large part to the tax-favored treatment of certain employer-provided fringe
benefits."). Courts have held that ERISA preempts state and local government laws requiring
employers to extend certain domestic-partner benefits. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Me. v. City of
Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Me. 2004). For analysis of these issues and arguments that ERISA
does not preempt such requirements, see Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of State and Local
Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76
TUL. L. REV. 373 (2001).
169. Anti-Discrimination Law in Rhode Island, GLAD (Dec. 8, 2010),
http://www.glad.org/rights/rhodeisland/c/anti-discrimination-law-in-rhode-island/ (last visited June 17,
2012); see also Severino, supra note 13, at 961 ("Before Goodridge [extended the right to marry to
same-sex couples in Massachusetts], courts generally did not require employers to extend benefits to
same-sex partners absent specific language in state and municipal anti-discrimination statutes.").
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When lesbian and gay litigants have pursued a relationship-based
interpretation of state antidiscrimination norms in court, they have emerged
with mixed results. In the public employment context, some state courts have
resisted the claim that discrimination against same-sex couples constitutes
sexual orientation discrimination.' In rejecting Minneapolis's attempt to
extend the list of benefit recipients to include same-sex partners, a Minnesota
appellate court claimed that when the Minnesota legislature decided to include
sexual orientation in its antidiscrimination law, it did not intend to include
same-sex partner benefits.' 7 1 At the time, the state senate author of the new
antidiscrimination provision declared, "There is nothing in here
about ... domestic partner[] benefits. Nothing that could lead to it."'' 72
Furthermore, courts tend to understand the employer's differential treatment to
hinge on marriage, 173 when in fact marital designations merely reflect and
perpetuate the unequal treatment of relationships based on sexual orientation.
Indeed, even when courts have ruled in favor of same-sex couples in this
context, some have found unlawful marital status, rather than sexual
orientation, discrimination.
174
170. See, e.g., Hinman v. Dep't of Pers. Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516 (1985); Rutgers
Council of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997); Phillips v. Wis. Pers.
Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the exclusion of same-sex partners
from the state employee health insurance program "applies equally to hetero- and homosexual
employees and thus does not discriminate against the latter group"); cf Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,
527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (invalidating a city council resolution that authorized
reimbursements of medical costs for city employees' same-sex partners as exceeding the city's
authority under state law).
171. Lilly, 527N.W.2dat 112.
172. Id. (quoting S. Floor Debate on S.F. No. 444 (Mar. 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Allen
Spear)); see also Megan P. Norris & Mark A. Randon, Sexual Orientation and the Workplace: Recent
Developments in Discrimination and Harassment Law, 19 EMP. RELS. L.J. 233, 241 (1993)
(documenting state statutes that provide for sexual orientation nondiscrimination but explicitly exclude
benefits for same-sex partners).
173. See Rutgers Council, 689 A.2d at 838 ("[I]t is not only homosexual partners that are
prohibited from marrying, therefore, the [benefits plan] cannot be said to 'discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation."'); Phillips, 482 N.W.2d at 127 ("And while [the plaintiff] complains that she is not
married to [her partner] only because she may not legally marry another woman, that is not a claim of
sexual orientation discrimination in employment; it is ... a claim that the marriage laws are unfair
because of their failure to recognize same-sex marriages.").
174. See, e.g., Tumeo v. Univ. of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43, 1995 WL 238359, at *6 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995) ("The University, by providing added health care coverage for married
employees but not for unmarried employees, is compensating married employees to a greater extent
than it compensates unmarried employees."). But see Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d
781, 788 (Alaska 2005) (finding the benefits program distinguished between same-sex and different-
sex couples); Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 447-48 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
the denial of insurance benefits to same-sex partners constituted unconstitutional sexual orientation
discrimination). In the housing context, the New York Court of Appeals held that same-sex couples
could state a claim for disparate impact, but not disparate treatment, based on sexual orientation in
their challenge to a private university's denial of school-owned housing to same-sex couples. Levin v.
Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1105-06 (N.Y. 2001).
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On the federal level, the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) purports to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in employment,
but includes a provision making clear the law would not require employers to
provide same-sex partner benefits. 175 While this provision is relatively
unsurprising, especially in light of the explicit authorization to discriminate
against same-sex couples in the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 176 it
nonetheless demonstrates the continued influence of antidiscrimination law's
constrained approach to sexual orientation. 177 A static, individualistic concept
of sexual orientation governs to the exclusion of a relationship-based
understanding. 178
This type of inconsistent treatment resonates with Professor Yoshino's
qualification of the gay progress narrative. He notes that more recent forms of
discrimination continue to burden lesbian and gay identity, and in fact may do
so more dangerously since they often operate under the appearance of
improved treatment.' 79  An antidiscrimination law that includes sexual
orientation but functions so as to exclude same-sex relationships from
protection may burden lesbian and gay identity in significant ways while
adopting the guise of progress. Such developments are not unique to sexual
orientation. As Professor Reva Siegel has argued in her theory of preservation-
through-transformation, status hierarchies may be preserved even as they are
ostensibly dismantled. 80 Here, antidiscrimination law's disaggregation of
175. S. 811, 112th Cong. §§ 4, 8 (2011).
176. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998)).
177. Of course, the individualistic commitment made sense as a strategic and political matter,
providing compromise that increases the possibility of passing a federal antidiscrimination law. See
Pizer et al., supra note 63, at 764 ("The exclusion of an equal benefits requirement from a bill designed
to ensure equal treatment, including equal terms and conditions of employment, may be recognized as
a political compromise that was driven years ago by the concerns of some about the costs of domestic
partner benefits."). But as more private and public employers recognize same-sex couples, the
relationship-based carve-out in ENDA seems increasingly outdated. Indeed, scholars are persuasively
arguing that ENDA should be updated in this regard. See id. at 760-64.
178. Of course, the inconsistency I observe in the sexual orientation context is not necessarily
limited to that context. For instance, as Onwuachi-Willig and Willig-Onwuachi show in the context of
discrimination against interracial couples, a focus on the individual obscures the unique harms
experienced by multiracial families. See Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 144, at 245.
Similarly, Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati demonstrate that employment antidiscrimination
protections inadequately remedy identity-based harms stemming from actively managing one's
minority identity in the workplace. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 147, at 1262-63.
179. See Yoshino, supra note 89, at 865 ("The shift from burdening homosexual status to
burdening homosexual sodomy is not much of a shift because sodomy is at least partially constitutive
of gay identity.").
180. Siegel documents preservation-through-transformation in the domains of gender and race.
In both cases, a new justificatory rhetoric subtly arises that preserves the particular status hierarchy
even as that hierarchy is partially dismantled. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove ": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996); Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer
Protects, supra note 148, at 1119. For analysis of concepts related to the preservation-through-
transformation phenomenon, see JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL
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sexual orientation from same-sex relationships perpetuates the subordination of
lesbians and gay men while purporting to advance lesbian and gay equality
(and in fact advancing such equality in significant ways).18 A sexual
orientation-based status hierarchy is preserved in subtle ways, as the move
toward sexual orientation nondiscrimination emerges along with a rhetoric that
divests such nondiscrimination of a strong normative message about lesbian
and gay equality; through justifications based on public/private distinctions,
individualistic assessments, and religious accommodation, sexual orientation
antidiscrimination law disavows the same-sex relationships that enact sexual
orientation identity.
The mixed message sent by sexual orientation antidiscrimination law
undermines one of the central purposes of the law itself. Nondiscrimination
mandates constitute the state's endorsement of norms that should shape social
practices. 182 In this sense, a sexual orientation nondiscrimination regulation
sends the message that lesbians and gay men deserve equal treatment and
respect.!83 Even opponents of gay rights laws acknowledge the highly symbolic
FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 172 (2011) ("If we want to understand how inequality is reproduced in
the United States, we must consider how the law of equality assists in this reproduction .... "); see also
id. at 141 (noting that "even (and especially) when law participates in social change, law is complicit
in the new forms of social stratification that replace older, discredited forms").
181. Yoshino himself draws on Siegel's work in his critique of the gay progress narrative,
seeing the transition from conversion to passing in the sexual orientation context as part of a
preservation-through-transformation dynamic. Yoshino, supra note 89, at 825-26; cf William N.
Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation ofAntigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of
Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2000) (arguing that anti-gay arguments relying on
images of gay people as "diseased or predatory ... have been supplemented with arguments that
progay changes in law or norms would encourage homosexuality or homosexual conduct").
182. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTDISCRIMINATiON LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 4
(1996). There is of course lively debate in antidiscrimination scholarship about whether the cultural
transformation model is an accurate descriptive account and normative theory of the law. See Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of Culture
Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1588, 1591-92 (1997). While Professor Hills
frames his institutional justification for antidiscrimination law as a critique of Koppelman's cultural
transformation approach, it might instead be understood as a significant qualification that is
nonetheless consistent with Koppelman's aims.
183. Discussing the state's move away from laws that stigmatize homosexuality and toward
laws that recognize lesbians and gay men as full citizens, Koppelman contends that "[diestigmatization
is what opponents of juridical gay rights most fear, and they are correct in thinking that this would be
the consequence of legally recognizing such rights, for example gay marriage." KOPPELMAN, supra
note 182, at 175. In the same vein, Professor Chai Feldblum argues that decisions made in legislating
around rights are decisions about moral positions. With this insight, "it becomes easier to understand
that a civil rights law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation might be shocking for
some members of society." Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion,
72 BROOK. L. REv. 61, 87 (2006). For those members of society, "it is problematic when the
government passes a law that gives [sexual minorities] equal access to all societal institutions." Id. This
type of law "presumes the moral neutrality of homosexuality and bisexuality, while those who oppose
the law believe homosexuality and bisexuality are morally problematic." Id. Similarly, Professor
David Cruz worries about religious exemptions to sexual orientation nondiscrimination laws based in
large part on the potential denigration of important values fostered by such legislation. David B. Cruz,
Note, Piety and Prejudice: Free Exercise Exemption from Laws Prohibiting Sexual Orientation
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stakes of such legislation, thus bolstering the idea that antidiscrimination law
serves what Professor Andrew Koppelman calls a project of cultural
transformation.' 8 4 But sexual orientation antidiscrimination regimes have failed
to send a sufficient message of lesbian and gay equality.18 5 Instead, they have
preserved a status hierarchy in which a key component of lesbian and gay
identity-same-sex relationships-is marked as inferior.
B. Destabilizing the Individual, Protecting the Relationship
The time seems ripe to expose and remedy the dissonance between the
individual and relationships in sexual orientation antidiscrimination law. In
fact, there are several indications that the law may eventually protect same-sex
relationships under the rubric of sexual orientation.
1. Constitutional Developments
Outside the context of statutory antidiscrimination law, courts
increasingly understand the connections between conduct and status in the
sexual orientation context. The original conduct-status distinction-between
sodomy, on the one hand, and lesbian and gay identity, on the other-helped
justify the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.18 6 The Court
treated Georgia's anti-sodomy law chiefly as a prohibition on conduct, even as
its analysis slipped between acts and identity, and conflated (gender-neutral)
anti-sodomy laws with homosexuality. 187 In the wake of Bowers, gay rights
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1221 (1994). Cruz expresses concern that exceptions "would
undermine the egalitarian public order that such laws seek to establish, creating precisely the access
and dignitary harms that the Supreme Court held to be the legitimate concern of antidiscrimination
laws." 1d.; see also Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the Religious
Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry, 89 GEO. L.J. 719, 751
(2001) ("[R]eligious exemptions from gay rights statutes undermine the basic purposes and doctrinal
theories of those statutes, whether viewed as attempts to eliminate morality judgments, as attempts to
affirm tolerance principles, or both.").
184. KOPPELMAN, supra note 182, at 4. Professor Richard Duncan explains that the passage of
a gay rights law "sends a message to society" that legitimizes homosexuality and makes clear "that the
government is so committed to this value that it will bring force to bear against those who wish to
manage their businesses in accordance with a different code of ethics." Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants
to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 393, 413-14 (1994).
185. See Lau, supra note 105, at 1280 ("[S]ome states, such as Illinois, simultaneously
proscribe discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations while explicitly
prohibiting same-sex marriage. This situation creates uncertain dynamics for same-sex couples.").
186. See 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (focusing the constitutional analysis on the right to
engage in conduct (sodomy)).
187. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. In dissent, Justice Stevens addressed how the state's
"selective application" of the statute targeted a "disfavored group," thereby serving as a means to
single out individuals based on status. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). And Justice Blackmun, also
in dissent, drew attention to the contrast between the majority's focus on "homosexual activity" and
the broadly applicable Georgia statute. Id at 200 (Blaclonun, J., dissenting); Halley, supra note 103, at
1741-42 (elaborating on the dissenters' critiques).
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advocates found it difficult to argue for nondiscrimination at the federal level
based on lesbian and gay identity while criminal prohibitions on the conduct
seen to define the group remained constitutional.
8 1
Advocates responded by turning to state courts, which began to part ways
with the Supreme Court by reading analogous state constitutional due process
and equal protection provisions to prohibit anti-sodomy laws.' 8 9 Building on
these emerging principles favorable to lesbian and gay identity (and
constitutive conduct), state courts began to understand the unequal treatment of
same-sex relationships more generally as sexual orientation discrimination. For
example, in Snetsinger v. Montana University System, 190 the Montana Supreme
Court built on its earlier holding in Gryczan v. State, which had struck down
Montana's anti-sodomy law under the Montana Constitution.1 91 Moving from
sexual liberty to sexual orientation equality, the court in Snetsinger found that
the state university system violated the state equal protection guarantee by
providing employee benefits to the common-law spouses of heterosexual
employees while withholding such benefits from employees' same-sex
partners. 92 So long as the university offered benefits to unmarried couples, it
had to do so on an equal basis. Treating same-sex relationships differently than
similarly situated different-sex relationships constituted discrimination based
on sexual orientation.' 
93
State court decisions rejecting prohibitions on conduct constitutive of
lesbian and gay identity began to mount, and eventually the U.S. Supreme
Court revisited its damaging Bowers decision. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
overruled Bowers and recognized that laws prohibiting same-sex sex in fact
target lesbian and gay identity. 194 Justice Kennedy articulated a capacious view
of liberty that included intimate conduct (seemingly predicated on a
relationship), 195 and then linked this liberty interest to equality principles. 196
188. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the Court [in Bowers]
was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly
open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.").
But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2, which
precluded sexual orientation antidiscrimination protections, on equal protection grounds). See also
NeJaime, supra note 140, at 989. For a critique of the assumption that the act of sodomy defined the
relevant group (homosexuals), see Halley, supra note 103, at 1722.
189. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18
(Ga. 1998); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
190. 104 P.3d 445, 452 (Mont. 2004).
191. 942 P.2d 112,126 (Mont. 1997).
192. Snestsinger, 104 P.3d at 452.
193. Id.
194. 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). Lawrence involved a "homosexual conduct" law, unlike
the gender-neutral law in Bowers. But the Lawrence Court made clear that both brands of anti-sodomy
laws are unconstitutional. See id.
195. See id. at 567 ('The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals."). While I am pointing to the potential strengths of the Court's relationship-
based focus, other scholars have criticized the Court's necessary linkage between sexual intimacy and
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Restrictions on intimate conduct, the Court reasoned, invite and authorize
discrimination based on identity.' 
97
Kennedy's rhetoric moved beyond (private) same-sex sex and instead
gestured toward the (potentially public) same-sex relationships that enact
lesbian and gay identity. 98 In linking sexual orientation-based identity to
sexual orientation-based liberty (status to conduct), Kennedy connected the
more ephemeral sexual relationship between the petitioners to more permanent
same-sex relationships,' 99 thereby suggesting the way in which relationships
are linked to the actualization of identity.
200
relationships. See Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 23, at 1407-09; Murray, Marriage as
Punishment, supra note 23, at 57-58; Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 811 (2010); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights vs. Queer Theory: What is Left
of Sodomy After Lawrence v. Texas, 23 Soc. TEXT, Fall-Winter 2005, at 235, 241.
196. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 ("Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests."); see also Nan D. Hunter, Living with
Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1134 (2004) ("The Court's combination of liberty and equality
produces an opinion that seems more holistic and connected to social experience and practice than
likely would have been the case if the Court had separated its analyses of substantive due process and
equal protection into distinct segments.").
197. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 ("When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres."). While Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence, did not link liberty and equality in the way that Justice Kennedy did, she nonetheless
noted the way in which same-sex conduct is associated with and enacts lesbian and gay identity. See
id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of
the law by making particular conduct-and only that conduct-subject to criminal sanction."); see
also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1905-07 (2004) (discussing the Court's recognition of the connection
between sodomy bans and the stigmatization of lesbians and gay men).
198. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would
demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse."); see also Tribe, supra note 197, at 1945 ('[T]he most distinctive facet of Lawrence is
surely the decision's focus on the right to dignity and equal respect for people involved in intimate
relationships, whether or not they choose to keep those relationships closeted - a right beyond any that
can be secured just by locking the state's police and prosecutors out of people's bedrooms.").
199. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 ("When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice."). For a critical perspective on the link between sex and intimacy, see Rosenbury & Rothman,
supra note 195, at 811. For a fascinating history of Lawrence suggesting that the petitioners may not
have actually engaged in any sexual acts together, see DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE
STORY OF LA WRENCE V. TExAs (2012).
200. Cf Tribe, supra note 197, at 1936 ("[Tlhe associational claim in Lawrence entails both an
intimate, inward-looking dimension as well as expressive dimensions that are both internal to the
relationship itself and profoundly private, and integral to how the partners in that relationship choose to
present themselves to the world.").
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A significant amount of scholarship drawing on Lawrence's reasoning
attempts to link the decision to the push for marriage equality.21' And, in fact,
courts ruling in favor of same-sex couples in marriage cases have cited
Lawrence for key principles of liberty and equality.20 2 Most recently, a Ninth
Circuit panel ruled Proposition 8, the California constitutional amendment thatS• 203
eliminated same-sex couples' right to marry, unconstitutional, and federal
district courts have held that DOMA's denial of federal recognition to same-sex
couples' state law marriages constitutes impermissible sexual orientation
204discrimination. Overall, then, constitutional adjudication of claims relating to
same-sex marriage significantly advances the idea that discrimination against
same-sex relationships constitutes sexual orientation discrimination. This is
especially true when a court situates marriage restrictions in broader patterns of
discrimination against lesbians and gay men.
20 5
Notwithstanding Lawrence's implications for marriage, the Court's clear
conceptualization of same-sex relationships (rather than same-sex marriage) as
part of sexual orientation identity is significant for our purposes. Indeed,
Kennedy, as well as Justice O'Connor in her concurrence, explicitly disclaimed
a connection between the Court's holding and marriage for same-sex
couples. 206 But the connection between same-sex relationships and lesbian and
207gay equality is a consistent theme throughout the opinions. And that
201. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marty: Same-Sex
Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1184 (2004); Jack B. Harrison,
The Future of Same-Sex Marriage After Lawrence v. Texas and the Election of2004, 30 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 313 (2005); Jason Montgomery, An Examination of Same-Sex Marriage and the Ramification
of Lawrence v. Texas, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 687 (2005); Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-
Sex Marriage Bans: On Constitutional Interpretation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1003 (2004).
202. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affdsuh
nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), reh'g denied, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. June 5,
2012); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
203. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1093 (relying on Lawrence).
204. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 994 (N.D. Cal.
2012) (relying on Lawrence); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389-90 (D. Mass.
2010) (same). Indeed, this position has been pushed by the Department of Justice. See Letter from Eric
H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20l 1/February/I l-ag-223.htrnl (last visited June 17,
2012).
205. See Peny, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
206. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Indeed,
Professor Ariela Dubler has argued that "Justice Kennedy's analysis suggests that Lawrence and
Gamer's relationship was licit not in spite of its nonmarital status but, rather, at least in part, because of
its nonmarital status." Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115
YALE L.J. 756, 810 (2006).
207. Nonetheless, as other scholars have argued, the Court seemed to privilege marriage-like
relationships, while nonnormative sexual relationships seemed outside the scope of the Court's logic.
See Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 23, at 1407-09; Murray, Marriage as Punishment,
supra note 23, at 58-59; Ruskola, supra note 195, at 241. But see Dubler, supra note 206, at 809-10.
The Court's privileging of marriage-like relationships is especially pronounced given that the
underlying facts in Lawrence did not suggest a committed, long-term relationship between the
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connection is essential to a robust antidiscrimination regime that includes same-
sex relationships, not merely same-sex married couples.
Ultimately, Lawrence constitutes a crucial moment in the developing shift
toward recognizing that unequal treatment of same-sex relationships is
unconstitutional sexual orientation discrimination.208 For example, even outside
the context of direct challenges to discriminatory marriage laws, courts
increasingly reject government discrimination against same-sex couples. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lawrence, recently affirmed a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
preventing the state of Arizona from removing same-sex partners of state
employees from healthcare coverage. 20 9 The court reasoned that "barring the
state of Arizona from discriminating against same-sex couples in its
distribution of employee health benefits ... is consistent with long standing
equal protection jurisprudence." 210 In this sense, the court advanced the idea
that discrimination against same-sex relationships constitutes impermissible
sexual orientation discrimination.
2. Statutory Developments
Statutory antidiscrimination law also has shown signs of broadening to
encompass same-sex relationships. First, some states with nonmarital
relationship recognition regimes for same-sex couples, such as domestic
partnerships or civil unions, have added these designations to the list of
prohibited grounds in antidiscrimination law. As Bernstein demonstrates, New
Jersey extended the marital status concept to its state-recognized same-sex
relationships by explicitly including domestic partnership and civil union status
as protected categories within its law against discrimination. 21 Therefore, if it
was not clear that formally partnered same-sex couples would be covered under
existing sexual orientation-based protections, they now receive predictable
coverage under these new categories. Of course, this development might also
suggest that same-sex couples not in civil unions or domestic partnerships
would struggle to receive protection as couples under the rubric of sexual
orientation and thus be left unprotected.
Second, some state courts have interpreted marital status
nondiscrimination mandates-provisions originally designed for heterosexual
petitioners. See Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464,
1478 (2004).
208. Again, important moments in this upward trajectory predate Lawrence. In 1998, for
instance, an appellate court in Oregon held that while the state university's denial of insurance benefits
to same-sex partners did not violate the state law governing employment nondiscrimination, it did
violate the state constitutional guarantee of equality. See Tanner v. Or. Health Servs., 971 P.2d 435,
444,448 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
209. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2011).
210. Id.
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§10:5-1 to 10:5-49 (West 2012).
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contexts-to reach same-sex couples. 212 Marital status as an antidiscrimination
category has the capacity to destabilize the normally static, individualistic
subject of antidiscrimination law and thereby offers opportunities for a more
expansive understanding of sexual orientation discrimination. While some
states limit coverage under marital status prohibitions to an individual's status
as single, married, divorced, or widowed,2 13 others take a more capacious and
active view of marital status, which may include unmarried cohabiting
2M4
couples. In this form, marital status discrimination includes discrimination
flowing from one's relationship status. Its relational component resonates with
a central aspect of sexual orientation discrimination and shows how
relationship discrimination may fit within current articulations of
antidiscrimination law. Moreover, the marital status designation's family law
sensibility, which by definition is more relational and dynamic than traditional
antidiscrimination law, offers promise for a relationship-based application of
sexual orientation nondiscrimination principles.
Inclusion of same-sex relationships in antidiscrimination law through
categories such as marital status (as well as civil union and domestic partner
status) gives more same-sex couples recourse for discriminatory treatment.
However, this inclusion might also limit the promise of antidiscrimination law
by labeling discrimination against same-sex relationships as something other
than sexual orientation discrimination and restricting the kinds of same-sex
relationships covered. A California Supreme Court decision interpreting a
marital status nondiscrimination mandate as applied to a same-sex couple,
through multiple phases of that couple's relationship and the State's formal
recognition of same-sex relationships, reveals the shortcomings of resorting to
marital status coverage and suggests the moves necessary to achieve a
comprehensive sexual orientation nondiscrimination regime.
215
In Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, the Bemardo Heights
Country Club denied spousal privileges to a lesbian couple who were registered
domestic partners first under San Diego's municipal registration and then under
212. See, e.g., Tumeo v. Univ. of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43, 1995 WL 238359, at *8 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995).
213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c(b)(2) (2009) ("[T]he prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of marital status shall not be construed to prohibit the denial of a dwelling
to a man or a woman who are both unrelated by blood and not married to each other."); N.D. Fair
Hous. Council v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 562 (N.D. 2001) ("The cohabitation statute and the
discriminatory housing provision are harmonized by recognizing that the cohabitation statute regulates
conduct, not status."); see also Onwuachi-Willig & Willig-Onwuachi, supra note 144, at 250.
214. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 n.4 (Alaska
1994) (holding that landlord who refused to rent to unmarried couple discriminated against them based
not simply on their conduct but on their marital status).
215. Of course, both sexual orientation and marital status discrimination may occur
simultaneously. My point is that the resort to marital status may improperly limit the coverage of
antidiscrimination law for same-sex couples and obscure the operation of sexual orientation
discrimination.
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216California's state regime. The club's official membership policy allowed a
member's "legal spouse" to golf on an unlimited basis without paying
additional fees. 2 17 The couple sued under California's antidiscrimination law,
claiming that the club had engaged in unlawful marital status, sex, and sexual
orientation discrimination. The California Supreme Court held that the club's
distinction between domestic partners-under California's comprehensive
domestic partnership regime (which took effect in 2005)-and married couples
constituted unlawful marital status discrimination. 21 The court also found that
the pre-2005 differential treatment of same-sex couples, even those registered
as domestic partners under a state regime that provided limited rights and
benefits, did not constitute unlawful marital status discrimination. 2 19 More
importantly, the court held that the club's policy did not-either before or after
2005-facially violate the law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination.
220
Under an antidiscrimination regime that understands discrimination
against same-sex relationships as discrimination based on sexual orientation-
the model for which I am arguing-the club's treatment of the lesbian couple
constituted sexual orientation discrimination. In 2005, the club continued to
distinguish between different-sex married couples and same-sex domestic
partners, even though the domestic partnership statute now provided for
treatment of domestic partners as "spouses." 22 1 By doing so, the club engaged,
most critically, in disparate treatment based on sexual orientation, rather than
marital status. It treated same-sex relationships differently than similarly
situated different-sex relationships. Marital status merely served as a stand-in
for sexual orientation. Indeed, the California legislature made clear in the
Domestic Partner Act that the new legislation aimed to "reduce discrimination
on the bases of sex and sexual orientation.
222
When an entity differentiates between different-sex married couples and
same-sex domestic partners with the rights and benefits of marriage, it makes a
sexual orientation-based distinction. The distinction is effectively no different
than Catholic Charities' desire to treat different-sex married couples and same-
sex married couples differently in Washington, D.C. Just as that distinction is
based primarily on sexual orientation, rather than marital status, the distinction
between different-sex marriages and same-sex comprehensive domestic
partnerships (or civil unions) is based primarily on sexual orientation.
Furthermore, evidence in the record in Koebke undermines the court's
analysis by underscoring the way in which sexual orientation discrimination,
216. 115 P.3d 1212, 1215 (Cal. 2005).
217. Id. at 1214-15.
218. Id. at 1214.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1129.
221. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (a), (f) (West 2007); Koebke, 115 P.3d at 1214.
222. CAL. A.B. 205, § l(b) (2003).
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rather than marital status discrimination, motivated the club's differential
treatment of same-sex relationships during all phases of the relationship.
Unmarried different-sex couples received spousal privileges despite their
complete lack of legal recognition.223 Marital status was in practice not the
exclusive means by which the club determined benefits eligibility. Instead,
heterosexuality (manifested in the form of different-sex coupling) was the
universal qualification. Under a sexual orientation nondiscrimination mandate,
the club should be required to provide "spousal" privileges to same-sex
unmarried couples on an equal basis.
Nonetheless, the majority held only that the plaintiffs might be able to
show that the club's "spousal benefit policy was discriminatorily applied."
224
Yet statements by club members and officials revealed an intent to restrict
membership for same-sex couples, not for unmarried couples.225 As Justice
Werdegar argued, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, the lesbian couple
should be allowed to pursue not merely the "claim of discriminatory
application," but also the claim that the club "maintained its spousal benefit
limitation as a 'subterfuge' or 'device' to accomplish prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
226
In the end, the centrality of sexual orientation discrimination and the
secondary nature of marital status discrimination become clear. The lesbian
couple suffered disparate treatment based on sexual orientation throughout the
course of their relationship. The club discriminated against them based
primarily on sexual orientation, treating different-sex couples better than same-
sex couples, during every relevant period-from 1995 to 1999, when the
couple had no formal state-law relationship designation; from 1999 to 2004,
when the couple maintained domestic partner status under California law but
such status was not equivalent to married spouses; and from 2005 on, when the
couple had a comprehensive domestic partnership under California law.
3. Toward a Relationship-Inclusive Antidiscrimination Regime
The use of marital status (and civil union and domestic partner)
designations to protect legally recognized same-sex couples from
discrimination limits coverage of antidiscrimination law to only certain same-
sex relationships. Worse yet, it conceptually distinguishes discrimination based
on marital (or equivalent nonmarital) status from discrimination based on
sexual orientation. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on connecting sexual
223. Koebke, 115 P.3dat 1215-16, 1229.
224. Id. at 1229 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 1216.
226. Id. at 1233 (citation omitted). Werdegar also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the club's denial of spousal privileges between 2000 and 2004, when the same-sex couple were
registered domestic partners under a regime providing only limited rights and benefits, did not
constitute marital status discrimination. See id. at 123-32.
2012]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
orientation discrimination to discrimination against same-sex relationships,
both married and unmarried.
Marriage equality itself does a great deal of work in this regard. While the
focus on marriage may limit the possibilities for a robust and inclusive
relationship discrimination regime, the marriage equality campaign, including
more recent litigation challenging DOMA, has helped to demonstrate that
unequal treatment of same-sex relationships constitutes sexual orientation
discrimination.227 In this sense, the marriage issue pushes relationship
discrimination as sexual orientation discrimination.
228
As more states officially recognize the marriages of same-sex couples, it
becomes apparent that the disparate treatment of different-sex and same-sex
relationships results from views about sexual orientation, not simply marital
status. 22 9 When Catholic Charities explains that it cannot treat same-sex
married couples like different-sex married couples, it is clear that sexual
orientation is the distinguishing characteristic. Catholic Charities' earlier
argument, under Washington, D.C.'s antidiscrimination law and domestic
partnership regime, that it was merely distinguishing based on marital status is
exposed as primarily a stand-in for sexual orientation discrimination. The onset
of marriage, then, lays bare the similarity between the Bemardo Heights
Country Club and Catholic Charities: neither wants to provide equal treatment
to same-sex relationships, regardless of whether those relationships manifest
themselves through marriage. Their objections derive more from the operation
of sexual orientation than from the unique status of marriage. In this way,
marriage uncovers sexual orientation discrimination. Still, it does not define
such discrimination.
While jurisdictions with marriage equality offer an opportunity to expose
discrimination against same-sex relationships as sexual orientation
discrimination, jurisdictions without marriage for same-sex couples may
227. See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 982 (N.D. Cal.
2012) ("Here, DOMA makes distinctions between legally married couples, by granting benefits to
opposite-sex married couples but denying benefits to same-sex married couples. Accordingly, DOMA
treats gay and lesbian individuals differently on the basis of their sexual orientation."); Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010) ("In the wake of DOMA, it is only sexual
orientation that differentiates a married couple entitled to federal marriage-based benefits from one not
so entitled.").
228. See Berg, supra note 13, at 213 (explaining that courts issuing marriage equality
decisions have rejected a conduct-status distinction and have instead held "that same-sex intimate
conduct correlates so greatly with same-sex orientation that the discrimination runs against the
orientation").
229. See Berg, supra note 13, at 211 ("Once a traditionalist organization has to distinguish
between couples that are legally married, it will be fully subject, perhaps for the first time, to a charge
of sexual orientation discrimination."); Severino, supra note 13, at 962 ("[E]mployers were largely
free to withhold benefits from same-sex couples and could justify their actions by merely relying on
state marriage statutes. However, with the arrival of legal same-sex marriage, courts are increasingly
likely to hold that equal protection principles and anti-discrimination statutes require every employer to
extend spousal benefits to same-sex couples if they provide spousal benefits at all.").
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present the most significant opportunities to work toward a robust
antidiscrimination regime that includes relationship discrimination under the
rubric of sexual orientation. Without the formal protections of marriage, gay
rights advocates can press arguments of sexual orientation discrimination that
the ability to marry might otherwise mediate.230 By doing so, they can decenter
marriage such that same-sex relationships are treated, as a general matter, like
different-sex relationships. Moreover, they can show that the differential
treatment of same-sex relationships must be treated as a form of sexual
orientation discrimination rather than be obscured by the category of marital
status discrimination.23'
Accordingly, scenarios involving same-sex relationships with no formal
state recognition offer opportunities to clarify that the differential treatment at
stake hinges on sexual orientation. It is important, then, that state actors in a
handful of states have interpreted state antidiscrimination law to reach
unmarried same-sex couples explicitly based on sexual orientation, rather than
marital status. Willock, for instance, demonstrates the willingness of a state
Human Rights Commission and state courts to include same-sex relationships
with no formal recognition under the rubric of sexual orientation
nondiscrimination.232 New Mexico had no legal relationship recognition but
had a sexual orientation nondiscrimination mandate; discrimination targeting
the couple's same-sex commitment ceremony targeted the couple's sexual
orientation, thus constituting actionable sexual orientation discrimination.
Equality outside the context of marriage-and even outside the context of
relationship celebrations-might do the most work toward a regime of effective
sexual orientation equality. Indeed, the simple everyday treatment of same-sex
230. See Berg, supra note 13, at 211 ("Same-sex marriage ... eliminates an organization's
argument that it discriminates not against homosexual orientation but against all extramarital sexual
acts.").
231. The doctrinal implications of a relationship-based sexual orientation antidiscrimination
regime are complicated in the context of a marriage regime that continues to discriminate based on
sexual orientation. First, married different-sex couples should not receive more favorable treatment
than same-sex couples in analogous relationship regimes, including civil unions and comprehensive
domestic partnerships. Disparate treatment of different-sex and same-sex couples in this context
should be viewed as sexual orientation discrimination. Next, in states with discriminatory marriage
laws and no comprehensive relationship recognition for same-sex couples, deprivation of benefits to
unmarried same-sex couples should be understood as sexual orientation discrimination, rather than
simply as a marital status distinction. Finally, unmarried different-sex couples should not receive more
favorable treatment than unmarried same-sex couples. By understanding discrimination against same-
sex couples primarily as sexual orientation, rather than marital status, discrimination, we approach a
more comprehensive sexual orientation antidiscrimination regime that includes same-sex relationships.
Of course, even in a marriage regime that does not discriminate based on sexual orientation, the
antidiscrimination framework advanced here would not necessarily mediate the privileging of marriage
by the state and private actors. See, e.g., Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Since
in this case eligibility was limited to married couples, different-sex couples wishing to retain their
current family health benefits could alter their status-marry-to do so."). Indeed, marriage itself
necessarily discriminates. See SPADE, supra note 147, at 66.
232. See discussion supra Part It.
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couples, in situations where marital status reasoning offers little promise, puts
the question of sexual orientation nondiscrimination in stark relief.
A conflict from Oregon, which has a sexual orientation antidiscrimination
law and a comprehensive domestic partnership statute, provides an illuminating
example. A lesbian couple sought counsel from Lambda Legal when the
Huntington Lions Club refused to extend them the preferential couples' rate to
233the catfish derby. The Lions Club apparently would have allowed the same-
sex couple to take advantage of the couples' rate policy if they produced proof
of their relationship, presumably in the form of domestic partnership
registration under Oregon law. 234 But different-sex couples were not required to
be in a legally recognized relationship, let alone provide proof of such a
relationship. 235 Therefore, the couple's proof of domestic partnership status
would not remedy the sexual orientation discrimination at issue; the Lions Club
treated all same-sex couples differently than all different-sex couples, whose
authentic and accepted relationship status was assumed without proof.
236
In response to a letter from Lambda Legal alleging sexual orientation
discrimination, the Lions Club effectively admitted that the treatment of the
lesbian couple constituted unlawful discrimination based on sexual orientation,
apologized to the couple, and vowed to comply with Oregon antidiscrimination
law.237 In this way, the Lambda Legal strategy-based on sexual orientation
rather than marital status-makes significant progress toward a sexual
orientation nondiscrimination principle that includes same-sex relationships,
regardless of marital status.
Lambda Legal lawyers recently filed a lawsuit in Hawaii that may provide
an additional advance on this front. A lesbian couple from California sought to
stay at the Aloha Bed and Breakfast while visiting their nearby friends, who
had recently had a child.238 Based on her religious beliefs, the Aloha proprietor
refused to rent a room to the couple because they were lesbians.239 The couple's
claim under antidiscrimination law rests entirely on sexual orientation, even
233. See Catfish Derby Discrimination, LAMDA LEGAL (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.
lambdalegal.org/publications/fa_20090804_catfish-derby-discrimination-promise (last visited June 17,
2012).
234. See id.
235. See Treatment of Lesbian Couple at Catfish Derby Lands Lions Club a Warning from
Lambda Legal, LAMDA LEGAL (July 21, 2009), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/or_20090721
lesbian-couple-catfish-derby-lions-club-warning.htlnl (last visited June 17, 2012).
236. See id.
237. See Lions Club Sends Letter of Apology to Oregon Lesbian Couple; Reminds Affiliates of
Non-Discrimination Policy, LAMDA LEGAL (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/or
20090804_lions-club-sends-letter-of-apology.html (last visited June 17, 2012).
238. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief, and Damages; Summons at I 8, 12,
Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.
lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/cervelli hi 20111219_complaint.pdf; see also Lambda Legal Files
Lawsuit on Behalf of Lesbian Couple Rejected by Hawaii Bed & Breakfast, LAMDA LEGAL (Dec. 19,
2011), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/hi_20111219_lambda-legal-files (last visited June 17, 2012).
239. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, supra note 238, at IM 16-18.
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though both California and Hawaii provide relationship recognition to same-
sex couples. Lambda Legal lawyers note that the two women "are not yet
married, nor are they reciprocal beneficiaries, registered domestic partners, or
parties to a civil union."240 As the lawyers argue, "the reason [the women] were
denied accommodations was because of their sexual orientation, not their
marital status. ' 24 1 Indeed, the proprietor of the bed-and-breakfast told the
Hawaii Civil Rights Commission "that it did not matter to her whether [the
women] were married or unmarried., 242 As they did in Oregon, then, Lambda
Legal attorneys are attempting to demonstrate that sexual orientation
nondiscrimination mandates should prevent discrimination against same-sex
couples qua couples, regardless of their marital status.
As this Part has shown, even though antidiscrimination law has tended
toward an individualistic, static, and unsophisticated view of sexual orientation,
there are encouraging signs suggesting that the law is increasingly protecting
same-sex relationships from discrimination. Yet there are still reasons for
concern. For instance, the rejection of sexual orientation as the primary lens-
and the appeal instead to marital and equivalent nonmarital status categories-
highlights the inadequacy of current iterations of antidiscrimination law in
dealing with sexual orientation discrimination.
To demonstrate another looming threat to hopeful trends in
antidiscrimination law, I now return to the preoccupation with religious
exemptions in the context of marriage for same-sex couples. On one level, the
current scholarly focus on marriage replicates some of the missteps in
antidiscrimination law by disaggregating same-sex relationships from lesbian
and gay identity. Yet on another level, the religious exemptions proposed by
scholars threaten to cut into progress in the antidiscrimination domain by
granting exemptions from antidiscrimination mandates that might otherwise
protect same-sex couples in their relationships. Moreover, doing so under the
guise of objections to same-sex marriage, rather than to straightforward sexual
orientation nondiscrimination, further obscures the operation of discrimination
against same-sex relationships.
IV.
THE PERVERSE EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE LAW ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION
As set forth in Part I, prominent religious liberty scholars, including
Professors Berg, Esbeck, Garnett, Laycock, and Wilson, have proposed the
following "marriage conscience protection," with slight variations, in both
scholarly writing and legislative appeals:
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No individual and no religious corporation, entity, association,
educational institution, or society shall be penalized or denied benefits
under the laws of this state or any subdivision of this state, including
but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing,
public accommodations, licensing, government grants or contracts, or
tax-exempt status, for refusing to provide services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related to the solemnization
of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any marriage, or for
refusing to treat as valid any marriage, where such providing,
solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause that individual or
religious corporation, entity[,] association, educational institution, or
society to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.243
In this Part, I show that by focusing on conduct-same-sex marriage-
without connecting that conduct to lesbian and gay status, the religious liberty
scholars proposing the "marriage conscience protection" gloss over the identity
interests at stake. In doing so, they replicate some of the missteps of
antidiscrimination law. Yet even as the "marriage conscience protection"
purports to relate only to the specific conduct of marriage, it allows
discrimination against same-sex relationships more generally, in contexts only
remotely related to marriage. In this way, the "marriage conscience protection"
attempts to perform antidiscrimination work in marriage law, and in the process
threatens to undermine the significant progress toward robust sexual orientation
nondiscrimination principles. The proposed exemptions target the basis of most
religious objections-same-sex relationships-but do so under the label of
marriage objections. Through marriage law, the state would allow
discrimination against same-sex relationships in a number of substantive
domains and throughout the marriage relationship, and yet elide the primary
basis of discrimination. In the end, ushering in marriage equality with the
proposed exemptions would, as an unintended consequence, produce a
significant amount of sexual orientation-based inequality.
A. Conduct over Status, Liberty over Equality
By emphasizing conduct, rather than status, when describing the
discrimination they would sanction, the scholars proposing the "marriage
conscience protection" misapprehend to some extent the sexual orientation-
based identity claims at issue. In a move that resonates with the individualistic
and static tendencies of antidiscrimination law, they frequently treat (marital)
same-sex relationships as distinct from lesbian and gay identity. Under this
view, restrictions placed on same-sex couples' marriages tend to implicate the
regulation of conduct, discussed in terms of liberty, more than the regulation of
status, which would require a more meaningful consideration of equality. As
243. Berg et al., Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 7-8. For the most recent iteration of the
"marriage conscience protection," see supra note 53.
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the following discussion shows, these scholars' efforts to elaborate and defend
the "marriage conscience protection" reveal the conceptual misstep behind their
proposal.
In a letter to the Connecticut legislature, Professor Laycock framed his
support for same-sex marriage in terms of "human liberty. ' 244 And in
encouraging the codification of religious exemptions, he emphasized the
importance of balancing competing claims to religious and sexual liberty.
245
But proponents of the proposed exemptions rarely connect their appeals to
liberty in a meaningful and explicit way to equality. 246 Indeed, Marc Stem
argues that "if the right to same-sex marriage sounds in equality, not
liberty,.. . arguments against an exemption become plain."247 In contrast, with
the lens of liberty preferred by many exemption proponents, "religious
exemption claims cannot be ignored.,
248
The proponents' preference for liberty over equality tracks their focus on
conduct over status and ultimately obscures the relevance of antidiscrimination
principles. As Professor Taylor Flynn shows in her compelling critique of the
proposed "marriage conscience protection," "exemption proponents have
244. Laycock, Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 1. Professor Shannon Gilreath faults Laycock
for minimizing the harm to lesbians and gay men and avoiding "any consideration of equality qua
equality." Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 205, 212. And Professors Lupu and Tuttle note the way in which both Laycock and
Wilson minimize the equality interests at stake regarding same-sex couples' right to marry. See Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 13, at 292-94.
245. See Laycock, Conn. Letter, supra note 16, at 2; see also Laycock, Afterword, supra note
41, at 189-90. This appeal to liberty on both sides suggests that the claims are equivalent in significant
ways. See Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41, at 189 ("Religious minorities and sexual
minorities... make essentially parallel and mutually reinforcing claims against the larger society.").
While liberty and conduct are implicated for both same-sex couples and religious objectors, the almost
exclusive focus on liberty and conduct fails to capture the issues of equality and status at stake. Indeed,
not only does this minimize the harm to same-sex couples, but it may also obscure the gravity of the
identity-based harms for religious objectors in a subset of situations. Professor Feldblum uses the more
productive concepts of "identity liberty" and "belief liberty." See Feldblum, Moral Conflict and
Liberty, supra note 183, at 62. Yet she also recognizes the slippage between these concepts and the
way in which proscriptions on conduct may operate as proscriptions on belief liberty. See id. at 100,
103.
246. Other commentators commit the same error outside of the marriage context. Ashlie
Warnick, for instance, outlines a model of antidiscrimination law in which religious groups are
allowed to discriminate based on conduct, not status. In her framework, which is highly deferential to
religious interests, "a religious organization can refuse to hire or choose to fire someone whose
conduct conflicts with the religion's moral code." Ashlie C. Wamick, Accommodating Discrimination,
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 128 (2008). For instance, religious organizations could terminate employees
"who violate religious tenets forbidding non-marital sexual relations." Id. at 131. Wamick uses a
conduct/status distinction to inform her normative analysis of antidiscrimination law. See id. at 167-
68. For example, she contends that when a lesbian employee at a Baptist college was terminated, such
termination was based on her conduct rather than her sexual orientation status. According to Wamick,
if the employee "was not in a homosexual relationship or outwardly refuting church teachings, the
church could not have argued that it fired her for some reason other than her status as a lesbian." Id. at
132.
247. Stem, supra note 13, at 314 (emphasis added).
248. Id.
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argued that. . . 'conduct'-based discrimination creates no status-based harm to
personhood, and instead merely constitutes insult."249 Yet this attempt to
minimize the status-based harm to same-sex couples runs counter to the actual
operation of discrimination in many contexts. As Flynn argues, with the
exemption proponents' reasoning, "a wide swath of discrimination (including
that based on religion) would be exempt from liability under antidiscrimination
laws, as conduct is frequently a proxy for status.' 25° In other words, conduct
and status-and liberty and equality-are at times inextricably linked.
While Laycock's analysis suggests some sensitivity to the lesbian and gay
identity claims at stake,251 Professor Wilson does not meaningfully consider the
connection between same-sex relationships (married or not) and lesbian and
gay status. She characterizes the trajectory of same-sex marriage advocacy as
"a concerted effort to take same-sex marriage from a negative right to be free of
state interference to a positive entitlement to assistance by others." 25 2 This
account misses the identity-based nature of same-sex relationships,
disaggregates same-sex marriage from general sexual orientation-based
equality claims, and therefore minimizes the extent of the injury when a same-
sex couple faces discrimination as a couple. Wilson's acknowledgment of "the
harm to one's dignity" 253 fails to recognize that such discrimination produces a
harm to one's identity. Indeed, even her catalogue of "the dignitary interests of
same-sex couples" includes only the relatively minor interests "not to be
embarrassed, not to be inconvenienced, [and] not to have their choice
questioned., 254 This focus on a diminished version of dignity is both too
general, linking harms from discrimination to all relationships (straight and
gay), and too specific, focusing on marriage instead of the profound connection
between same-sex relationships and lesbian and gay identity.
Furthermore, Wilson's attempt to model protection for religious objectors
in the same-sex marriage context on conscience clauses in the reproductive
rights domain underscores a lack of appreciation for the relevant identity-based
harms.255 Reproductive rights have suffered from an inability of courts and
lawmakers to understand infringements on reproductive freedom as sex-based
harms, 6 and the move to disaggregate same-sex relationships from sexual
249. Flynn, supra note 13, at 240-41.
250. Id. at 241.
251. See Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41, at 198 ("What is most importantly at stake for
each side is the right to live out core attributes of personal identity.").
252. Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 80. For a pointed critique of Wilson's
position, see Gilreath, supra note 244, at 206.
253. Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 101.
254. Id. at 94.
255. See id. at 80-81. For a similar analogy in the same-sex adoption context, see Robin
Fretwell Wilson, A Matter of Conviction: Moral Clashes over Same-Sex Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB.
LAW 475 (2008).
256. For discussions of the gender equality dimensions of abortion restrictions, including the
Supreme Court's attention to equality concerns, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of
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orientation identity reflects a similar but even more far-reaching failure to grasp
the identity-based harm at stake. Under this model, it is all conduct and no
status. Indeed, Wilson responds to the anticipated objection that her
reproductive-rights-based proposal burdens the conduct of marriage, but she
fails to address how it burdens status, or the enactment of sexual orientation
257identity.
In responding to criticisms of the "marriage conscience protection,"
Professor Berg focuses on marriage specifically and, like Wilson, draws on
conscience clauses in the abortion context. He argues that "[t]he exemption is
tied to direct personal facilitation of marriage," and therefore "fits comfortably
with the widely accepted 'conscience clauses' that protect refusal to participate
in or directly facilitate an abortion, another specific form of conduct." 258 Yet
Berg himself argues for accommodations that do not relate merely to the
marriage ceremony or wedding reception, 259 and in this way, his comparison to
"conscience clauses" in the abortion context runs counter to his broader
coverage. 26  Indeed, the analogy to conscience clauses reflects a lack of
appreciation for the temporal difference between an abortion, which occurs at a
specific moment in time, and a marriage, which endures over a significant
period of time.
Nonetheless, Berg comes closest to recognizing the immense equality
stakes for lesbians and gay men. In fact, he acknowledges the significance of
same-sex relationships to sexual orientation identity, arguing that for both
same-sex couples and religious objectors "conduct is fundamental to their
identity. ' 261 In the end, though, Berg turns away from equality, claiming that
"[g]iven equality's absolute nature, it is hard to see how it can allow for any
exemptions. ' 262 For pragmatic and instrumental reasons, Berg thus concludes
that "same-sex equality cannot be the dominant value., 263 Therefore, while his
analysis offers a deep recognition of the status-based harms to same-sex
couples, it consciously adopts a conduct-based lens and continues to view
marriage, not relationships, as the most relevant conduct.
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1779-80 (2008); Reva
B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 833-35 (2007).
257. See Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens, supra note 13, at 339. Professor Jana Singer criticizes
Wilson's comparison, arguing that "the analogy to health-based conscience clauses at most applies to
individuals who perform or solemnize marriages, not to the related services of caterers, photographers
or facility owners." Jana Singer, Balancing Away Marriage Equality, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2011,
1:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/balancing-away-marriage-equality/ (last visited June
17,2012).
258. Berg, supranote 13, at 233.
259. See id. at 227 ("[Tlhe religious organization's claim not to be forced to provide support
against its conscience extends beyond the marriage ceremony and accompanying events.").
260. Cf Singer, supra note 257.
261. Berg, supra note 13, at 212.
262. Id. at 226.
263. Id.
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B. The Refusal to "Treat as Valid" and Extension to Secular Actors
Given the focus on conduct and the corresponding failure to consistently
appreciate the constitutive nature of that conduct, it is unsurprising that the
scholars proposing the "marriage conscience protection" advocate
accommodations that claim to target only that specific conduct. As its title
suggests, the "marriage conscience protection" purports to be marriage
264specific. Yet the proposed provision would permit discrimination against
same-sex relationships in situations far removed from marriage, sweeping
within its reach (marital) same-sex relationships throughout the entire course of
those relationships. By covering the relationships of lesbians and gay men so
comprehensively, the "marriage conscience protection" would target the
enactment of sexual orientation identity in ways that sexual orientation
antidiscrimination law otherwise would not tolerate.
265
While there are several problems with the "marriage conscience"
proposal, one particularly problematic component-legal shielding of "refusing
to treat as valid any marriage"--illustrates its troubling breadth.266 With this
language, the provision reaches into key areas addressed by antidiscrimination
law and leaves same-sex couples vulnerable to discrimination based on their
sexual orientation identity. 267 The proposed religious accommodations threaten
to subject same-sex couples to discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and housing for the duration of the marriage and in situations
far removed from the marriage celebration.268
264. Indeed, these scholars opened their recent letter to New York lawmakers by arguing for
"a specific religious liberty protection ... clarifying that individuals and organizations may refuse to
provide services for a wedding if doing so would violate deeply held beliefs, while ensuring that the
refusal creates no substantial hardship for the couple seeking the service." Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter,
supra note 15, at 1 (emphasis added).
265. Wilson disputes the charge that her proposal would "lead to exemptions for all kinds of
conduct presently prohibited by anti-discrimination laws," instead reiterating that her exemption "is
limited by its terms to recognition and celebration of marriages." Robin Wilson, A Winner-Takes-All
Approach to State Same-Sex Marriage Laws Is Self-Defeating, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:16
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/a-winner-takes-all-approach-to-state-same-sex-marriage-
laws-is-self-defeating/ (last visited June 17, 2012).
266. The exemption proponents also use the language of "recognition." See Wilson et al., Md.
Letter, supra note 15, at 14 (arguing that the religious exemptions in the Maryland marriage bill are
inadequate because "the terms 'solemnization' and 'celebration' have temporal connotations closely
tied to the marriage ceremony itself-and presumably do not reach activities that would require a
religious organization to 'recognize' a couple's marriage long after the marriage's solemnization"
(emphasis added)); Laycock, Me. Letter, supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that the protection proposed by
Maine lawmakers "does not unambiguously provide that religious institutions need not recognize
same-sex civil marriages"). A refusal to recognize a same-sex couple's marriage seems analogous to a
refusal to treat that marriage as valid.
267. While Rhode Island adopted the "treat as valid" language in its civil union law, no state
has adopted this language in a marriage law.
268. See Berg, supra note 13, at 227 (explaining that his proposed accommodation "extends
beyond the marriage ceremony and accompanying events"); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at
292 ("[S]ervice providers are free to refuse assistance to an entire group of people-those in same-sex
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A religious employer allowed to refuse to "treat as valid" a same-sex
couple's marriage could refuse to provide healthcare benefits to the spouses of
lesbian and gay employees, regardless of whether the employees' positions
directly relate to the employer's religious mission, while providing such
benefits to the spouses of heterosexual employees. Under the "marriage
conscience protection," the married same-sex couple would be deprived of
healthcare benefits throughout the course of their relationship without legal
recourse. This sexual orientation discrimination, which might otherwise be
prohibited under state antidiscrimination law, would be justified as merely a
religious distinction.
While the broad accommodations for religious organizations are
troubling, the application of the religious exemption to secular actors in the
stream of commerce threatens to cut back existing antidiscrimination
protections in a much more sweeping fashion. Allowing such individuals and
businesses to avail themselves of the "marriage conscience protection" is
alarming even as it relates to marriage celebrations.269 It would, for instance,
allow the florist, the baker, and the photographer to refuse service. 27 But the
application of this exemption across the life of the same-sex couple's marriage
cuts a broad swath out of many states' antidiscrimination laws. That is, the
interaction of the "treat as valid" language with the inclusion of "individuals"
and "small businesses" among those entitled to accommodation renders the
exemptions even more potent and pushes far beyond existing antidiscrimination
exemptions.271
To be clear, the scholars advancing the "marriage conscience protection"
have refined their proposal over time. The more recent iteration of the
"marriage conscience protection" uses "treat as valid" terminology for religious
organizations, but is more specific for secular actors, allowing them to refuse to
"provide goods or services.., that directly facilitate the perpetuation of any
marriage," refuse to "provide benefits to any spouse of an employee," and
relationships-no matter how remote the assistance sought is from any specific action, such as a
wedding or adoption of a child.").
269. New Hampshire lawmakers recently rejected a bill that would have allowed business
owners and their employees to refuse, based on religious objections, to provide goods and services
related to the solemnization, celebration, or promotion of a marriage. See Zack Ford, News Flash: New
Hampshire Legislature Overwhelmingly Defeats 'License to Discriminate' Bill, THINKPROGRESS
(Mar. 15, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/03/15/445018/new-hampshire-
legislature-overwhelmingly-defeats-license-to-discriminate-bill/?mobile=nc (last visited June 17,
2012); Zack Ford, New Hampshire Legislature Considers 'License to Discriminate' Bill,
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 24, 2012, 5:35 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/01/24/410745/new-
hampshire-considers-license-to-discriminate-bill (last visited June 17, 2012).
270. A dispute between a baker and a same-sex couple recently arose in Iowa when the baker
informed the couple at their taste-testing appointment that, because of her religious beliefs, she could
not provide their wedding cake. See Wedding Cake Battle Between Couple, Baker, KCCI (Nov. 12,
2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.kcci.com/print/29753206/detail.html (last visited June 17, 2012).
271. See Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 3-4.
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refuse to "provide housing to any married couple."272 In practice, this language
would likely have the same impact as the "treat as valid" language.273 It simply
suggests with greater specificity what the refusal to "treat as valid" may mean.
Furthermore, the more recent proposal also limits exemptions in the
commercial context to individuals, sole proprietors, and small businesses.2 74
Even with these modifications and limitations, the religious exemption
would allow the relationship counselor to refuse to counsel the (married) same-
sex couple, the landlord to refuse to rent an apartment to the (married) same-
sex couple, the bed-and-breakfast proprietor to refuse to lodge the (married)
same-sex couple, and the caterer to refuse to cater the (married) same-sex
275
couple's anniversary party. Similarly, small secular employers, who claim
religious convictions authorizing opposition to same-sex marriage, could
provide benefits for the spouses of heterosexual employees but refuse to
provide such benefits to the legal spouses of lesbian and gay employees.
276
272. Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3; see also Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens,
supra note 13, at 332 (arguing for exemptions related to "directly facilitat[ing] the perpetuation of any
marriage"). While I am focusing on the breadth of the "treat as valid" language, which seems
functionally analogous to the alternative "facilitate the perpetuation" language, Lupu and Tuttle have
noted that the "facilitation" language standing alone-that is, merely regarding marriage celebration,
without reference to "perpetuation" of the marriage--could have consequences that bleed far outside
the bounds of the marriage celebration. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 292 ("[T]he exemption
could be claimed by anyone who believes that his or her conduct would facilitate a same-sex
marriage-that is, the ongoing relationship between a same-sex couple, and not just the wedding
ceremony itself"). For a discussion of the breadth of "facilitation," including in the housing and
healthcare contexts, relating to religious objections more generally, see Brietta R. Clark, When Free
Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the
Catholic Hospital Context, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 655, 672-73, 693 (2003).
273. Indeed, in the same letter proposing this language to Maryland lawmakers, the exemption
proponents argue that "[l]egal recognition of same-sex marriage can also place a real burden on
individuals .... Wilson et al., Md. Letter, supra note 15, at 15.
274. Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 4. The "marriage conscience protection"
defines small businesses as those in which services are "primarily performed by an owner" or that have
"five or fewer employees." Id. As Part I made clear, state-public-accommodations laws do not exempt
secular businesses, regardless of size. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. And many state-
employment laws cover employers with five or fewer employees. See supra note 85. The "marriage
conscience protection" provides that for rental housing, a small business "owns five or fewer units of
housing." Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 4. This is not limited to owner-occupied
housing, thus meaning that the "marriage conscience protection" would exempt landlords who would
not otherwise be exempted under state-housing laws. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
275. Berg acknowledges some of these effects, claiming for instance that a "religious
marriage-counseling center should not be forced to counsel a same-sex couple" and then arguing that
"accommodation[s] should extend to some individuals and organizations in the commercial context,
although the protections should be more limited." Berg, supra note 13, at 227. (Later, Berg refers to
proposed legislative accommodations that include "the traditionalist marriage counselor." Id. at 233.)
Berg also explains that "[t]he small landlord may feel direct responsibility for providing the space for
intimate conduct to which she objects; [and] the wedding photographer may feel direct responsibility
for using her artistic skills to present in a positive light a marriage to which she objects." Id. at 227.
276. Indeed, the more recent iteration of the "marriage conscience protection" makes this
explicit. See Wilson et al., N.Y. Letter, supra note 15, at 3 ("[N]o... small business shall be required
to ... provide benefits to any spouse of an employee."). Again, many state sexual orientation
antidiscrimination laws cover employers that would otherwise be exempted under the "marriage
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Therefore, an actor otherwise covered by antidiscrimination law could
treat a same-sex couple's marital relationship differently than it treats other
marital relationships. The actor could do this in the first year of the couple's
marriage, and in the twenty-first year. And the actor could do so even if
existing antidiscrimination laws protect on the basis of sexual orientation and
thereby prohibit the discrimination at issue. In other words, the exemption
would allow a covered actor to provide unequal treatment to same-sex
relationships by channeling that unequal treatment through religiously
grounded marriage objections and thereby avoiding existing antidiscrimination
obligations.
In scholarly writing on their legislative proposal, Wilson and Laycock
offer limits on the religiously motivated right to discriminate. 277 These limits
would govern only particular categories of objectors-secular commercial
actors278 and government employeesZ79 -and would not restrict religious
organizations' right to discriminate. 28 Wilson suggests a "significant hardship"
or "significant interference" standard, which would prevent discrimination
when it would pose a significant hardship on the same-sex couple's ability to
marry. 28 1 In the commercial setting, she argues that the best possible solution
might be "one that permits refusals for matters of conscience, but limits those
refusals to instances where a significant hardship will not occur. ' ' 82 Wilson
conscience protection." See supra note 85. Although Wilson and her colleagues now propose a
limitation that would disallow the accommodation if "a party to the marriage is unable to
obtain... employment benefits... without substantial hardship," see Wilson et al., Wash. Letter,
supra note 15, at 3, it is unclear what exactly would constitute a "substantial hardship" in this context.
277. See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 101-02; Laycock, Afterword, supra
note 41, 198.
278. See Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41, 198 ("Robin Wilson proposes what seems to me
a much more sensible balance: to protect the right of conscientious objectors to refuse to facilitate
same-sex marriages, except where such a refusal imposes significant hardship on the same-sex
couple."); see also id. (arguing that "the right to one's own moral integrity should generally trump the
inconvenience of having to get the same service from another provider nearby").
279. See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 99-100. The government employee
provision also appears in the legislative proposals. See, e.g., Berg et al., Me. Letter, supra note 16, at 9
("[N]o government official may refuse to solemnize a marriage if another government official is not
available and willing to do so.").
280. See Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41, 200 ("Professor Wilson and I seem to say that
outside the church itself, conscientious objectors to same-sex marriage can refuse to cooperate only
when it doesn't really matter because someone else will provide the desired service anyway.").
281. See Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens, supra note 13, at 340-41. Berg articulates a similar
standard, arguing that "[a]ccomnodation should be made... unless the religious objector's refusal of
services would cause a concrete hardship on the ability of the same-sex couple to marry." Berg, supra
note 13, at 208. It is clear from the references to the couple's ability to marry that the limitation as
originally envisioned focused on refusals relating specifically to the marriage celebration, thereby
limiting the right to discriminate in a relatively small subset of situations covered by the "marriage
conscience protection." The latest iteration of the proposal, however, applies the "substantial hardship"
limitation to a broader category of refusals. See infra note 286.
282. See Wilson, Matters of Conscience, supra note 40, at 81.
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derives her standard from constitutional doctrine regarding restrictions on the
right to marry-the conduct-based lens through which she views the issue.
283
Laycock adopts Wilson's hardship logic, arguing that "when a particular
merchant's refusal to cooperate might actually delay or prevent the conduct he
considers sinful, then he loses his rights and has to facilitate the sin.",
284
Laycock translates Wilson's "significant hardship" concept into a geographical
sliding scale. Businesses in more conservative regions would enjoy less of a
right to discriminate because the same-sex couple would face a more difficult
task in finding a willing provider. In Laycock's example, therefore, the florist
in the East Village could refuse to serve the same-sex couple because other
florists in the neighborhood are willing (in fact happy) to serve. This means that
rights of same-sex couples vis-A-vis religious objectors might be greater in
more rural (and likely more conservative) areas, where fewer merchants are
available, than in urban (and likely more progressive) areas, where we are
likely to find more available and willing merchants.285
These proposed limits on the right to discriminate eventually made their
way into the "marriage conscience protection" sent to state lawmakers. 286 The
most recent legislative proposal refuses accommodation for secular commercial
actors and government employees when refusal would result in "substantial
hardship" for the same-sex couple.287 And Laycock has suggested that this
"substantial hardship" provision accommodates the geographic differences he
identifies.288
Aside from administrative feasibility concerns, these "substantial
hardship" qualifications remain troubling. By focusing on conduct purportedly
relating to marriage, they continue to reflect a lack of appreciation for the
identity stakes in play for lesbians and gay men. The objecting florist in
Minnesota, for instance, would not merely be rejecting conduct by the same-
sex couple; rather, she would be refusing to serve the same-sex couple based on
their sexual orientation, as enacted through their same-sex relationship. The
florist would likely object to the same-sex couple's nonmarital commitment
283. See Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens, supra note 13, at 341.
284. Laycock, Afterword, supra note 41,200.
285. It is important to emphasize that Laycock implicitly departs from Wilson by noting that
conflicts would persist even in the absence of state-sanctioned marriage for same-sex couples. See id.
at 206.
286. While the limit on the right to discriminate did not appear in the legislative proposals sent
to lawmakers in Connecticut and New Hampshire, Wilson and her colleagues added a "substantial
hardship" clause to the legislative language sent to Maine Governor Baldacci; this clause specifically
related to "a refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
related to the solemnization of any marriage." See Berg et al., Me. Letter, supra note 16, at 9
(emphasis added). The most recent proposal applies more broadly to "good[s] or services, employment
benefits, [and] housing." See Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3.
287. See Wilson et al., Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3.
288. See Laycock et al.,Wash. Letter, supra note 15, at 3 ("The religious exemptions proposed
in the Wilson-Berg letter are drafted to exclude the rare cases where... a same-sex couple in a rural
area.., has reasonably convenient access to only one provider of some secular service.").
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ceremony in present-day Minnesota just as she would object to the same-sex
couple's legally recognized marriage in a hypothetical future Minnesota.
Neither the presence of officially sanctioned marriage nor the availability of
willing merchants would transform the florist's discriminatory treatment into
something other than sexual orientation discrimination.
Two objections might be raised to my general critique of the "marriage
conscience protection." First, in the absence of the religious accommodation,
the religious social-service provider might, like Catholic Charities in the
Massachusetts adoption context, stop serving everyone. Likewise, the religious
employer, like Catholic Charities in Washington, D.C., might simply stop
providing healthcare benefits for the spouses of all employees. Yet forcing the
organization to take such drastic action is preferable to exempting all religious
organizations from antidiscrimination obligations. I am confident that fewer
employers, for example, will choose to cut health insurance benefits entirely
than would refuse to provide such benefits to married same-sex couples if
allowed to do so by statute. More importantly, giving these employers the
option to distinguish between married same-sex and different-sex couples
would authorize discrimination against lesbians and gay men, allowing
employers to harm employees based on the same-sex relationships that enact
their sexual orientation identity.
Second, some might object that antidiscrimination law currently does not
require equal treatment of same-sex relationships qua relationships. Employers,
for instance, do not have to treat same-sex relationships like different-sex
relationships. Therefore, the proposed exemptions merely preserve the status
quo, rather than take anything away from lesbians and gay men. As a threshold
matter, this is not entirely accurate. As I argued in Part III, antidiscrimination
law is beginning to understand discrimination against same-sex relationships,
regardless of marital status, as sexual orientation discrimination. While this
progress has been limited, the trend points toward more, not less, coverage of
same-sex relationships, and the proposed religious exemptions could stymie
this progress.
More generally, though, the advent of marriage for same-sex couples
deprives antidiscrimination law of a potent deflection of sexual orientation
discrimination claims. With marital status no longer serving as a way to argue
that same-sex and different-sex couples are differently situated, the operation of
sexual orientation discrimination becomes clearer. Therefore, marriage equality
should move antidiscrimination law toward more, not less, protection for same-
sex relationships. In other words, the marriage issue highlights the
shortcomings and inconsistencies of antidiscrimination law; it therefore should
not be used to perpetuate and bolster these shortcomings and inconsistencies.
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C. Shrouding Discrimination
As marriage becomes increasingly available to same-sex couples, more
and more same-sex couples will marry. Therefore, more lesbians and gay men
will be in relationships that come within the purview of the proposed religious
exemptions. If the proposed "marriage conscience protection" were adopted,
the advent of marriage for same-sex couples, a watershed moment for lesbian
and gay equality, would come with a substantial cutting back on
antidiscrimination protections meant to further such equality.289 More couples,
otherwise entitled to protection under antidiscrimination law, would be denied
such protection by operation of the marriage-based exemptions. In this way, a
number of instances of sexual orientation discrimination would cease to be
actionable.
Worse yet, the proposal categorizes discrimination against same-sex
couples as "marriage conscience protection" and thereby obscures the actual
occurrence of sexual orientation discrimination. The law would condone
discrimination against marital same-sex relationships without ever labeling it
sexual orientation discrimination. Businesses, for instance, could turn away
married or soon-to-be-married same-sex couples by invoking religious
objections to same-sex marriage. Their decisions, which would constitute
sexual orientation discrimination under existing antidiscrimination law, would
be framed instead as permissible, religiously motivated conduct relating to
marriage. "Marriage conscience" would provide a new language with which to
describe-and allow-sexual orientation discrimination against married same-
sex couples.
In the end, the "marriage conscience protection" threatens strides made in
the antidiscrimination domain, where we see increasing recognition that
discrimination against same-sex relationships is sexual orientation
discrimination. In a world of marriage equality, the most recognizable and
legally regulated same-sex relationships would be carved out of
antidiscrimination protections-not through transparent exemptions from
sexual orientation nondiscrimination provisions, but through accommodations
in the marriage context.
CONCLUSION
Where exactly does this leave us? Let me restate a clear starting point: I
support limited religious exemptions from sexual orientation nondiscrimination
provisions. 29 This support does not stem merely from a sense of political
efficacy but from a sincere normative commitment to religious freedom.
289. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 295 ("[I]n states that now include sexual orientation
under public accommodations and other antidiscrimination laws, the exemption would effectively
withdraw existing protections for same-sex couples.").
290. In fact, as compared to some sexual orientation scholars, I am open to relatively robust
accommodations. For instance, Professor Feldblum, one of the more vigorous defenders of religious
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I maintain, though, that a discussion of religious freedom in the context of
sexual orientation must take place in the domain of antidiscrimination law, not
simply in the marriage context.29 1 Failing to have the conversation in
antidiscrimination law obscures the lesbian and gay identity claims at stake,
glosses over the root of religious objections to lesbian and gay equality, and
hides discrimination against same-sex relationships. Therefore, we should
resolve the competing stakes of sexual orientation equality and religious liberty
in the antidiscrimination realm, removed from the misleading lure of
marriage.292
Scholarship on the conflicts between sexual orientation equality and
religious freedom offers models. Professor Andrew Koppelman, for instance,
balances the competing stakes in the antidiscrimination domain.293 Professor
Chai Feldblum situates the marriage issue within broader debates over sexual
orientation and religious liberty. 294 Professor Dale Carpenter identifies a
number of disputes arising outside of the marriage context and discusses
conflicts between same-sex couples and religious objectors that predate the
prominence of the marriage issue.295 And Professors William Eskridge and
Martha Minow, who both situate conflicts between sexual orientation and
religion along the historical trajectory of more general antidiscrimination law,
explore ways for advocates on both sides to negotiate specific conflicts and
produce practical solutions. 296 While I do not in this Article endorse the
specific exemptions offered by these scholars, I back a key component of their
liberty, offers only relatively limited accommodations. See Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty,
supra note 183, at 121-22 (exploring two limited circumstances in which religious accommodations
should possibly be provided).
291. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted in its decision striking down Proposition 8, "To the
extent that California's antidiscrimination laws apply to various activities of religious organizations,
their protections apply in the same way as before [Proposition 8 passed]." Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the argument that Proposition 8 protected religious liberty,
according to the Ninth Circuit, is "more properly read as an appeal to the Legislature, seeking reform
of the State's antidiscrimination laws to include greater accommodations for religious organizations."
Id.
292. As noted in Part I, states that have analyzed the issue through the marriage lens already
have sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws with religious exemptions on which to build.
293. See Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for
Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 135 (2006) (arguing for
"regulation-plus-exemptions" in the antidiscrimination domain).
294. Feldblum explores the constitutional stakes and analyzes how a legislature should balance
those stakes in antidiscrimination law. See Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty, supra note 183, at
115-16.
295. See Dale Carpenter, Religious Liberty and SSM, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (June 17, 2008,
8:24 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1213748649.shtml (last visited June 17, 2012).
296. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief
and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Nonns, 45 GA. L. REV. 657, 664 (2011); Minow, supra note
26, at 843-49; see also Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out", supra note 104, at 2456
(exploring the appropriate relationship between sexual orientation nondiscrimination principles and
accommodations for dissenting religious views).
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conceptual approach, which implicitly resists singling out marriage as a
distinctive issue with a unique set of problems.
297
I recognize the political obstacles to moving the conversation into the
antidiscrimination domain, given the current high-profile nature of the marriage
issue specifically. But considering and codifying religious exemptions in
antidiscrimination law, rather than in marriage law, is necessary for the
realization of sexual orientation nondiscrimination principles.298 At the same
time, it might force a more honest discussion of the relevant religious
objections and thereby yield more coherent and transparent accommodations. 299
While the task may be daunting, a comprehensive resolution in
antidiscrimination law holds greater promise for both a robust principle of
sexual orientation equality and ample space for religious dissent.
297. In fact, the scholars proposing the "marriage conscience protection" would likely endorse
the antidiscrimination prescriptions advanced by some of these scholars. See Koppelman, supra note
293, at 126 (arguing that "religious objectors should usually be accommodated"). Of course, the
scholars who deal with sexual orientation nondiscrimination and religious liberty in the
antidiscrimination domain disagree with each other quite vigorously on the proper scope of religious
accommodations. See id. ("(Feldblum] argues that religious claims to exemption from
antidiscrimination laws should almost always be rejected .... She loses sight, however, of comparable
intangible burdens felt by conservative Christians.").
298. Because of the substantial cutting back on constitutional free exercise protections by the
Supreme Court, accommodations will likely arise legislatively. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Volokh, supra note 71, at 1473; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 287-
88. It is too early to tell whether the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School signals broader deference to religious employers or instead will be read
narrowly to apply only to the ministerial exception. See 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012) (distinguishing
Smith). Nonetheless, free speech and expressive association claims likely offer greater potential for
religious objectors than free exercise claims. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000); see also Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v.
Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, The "War on Terror, " and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2009, 2014 (2011).
299. Conducting the balancing between sexual orientation equality and religious liberty
explicitly in antidiscrimination law could meet one of the central concerns of some of the religious
liberty scholars advancing the "marriage conscience protection." Professor Berg argues that
"recognizing gay marriage without accompanying religious exemptions may send the message that the
government has a compelling interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination in all contexts,
not just marriage-related ones." Berg, supra note 13, at 211. Putting aside the normative dimensions of
this claim and instead taLking it on its own terms, balancing the competing interests in
antidiscrimination law, rather than in marriage law, could produce a generally applicable carve-out
from sexual orientation nondiscrimination and mediate the concern regarding nonmarital contexts. Cf
Eskridge, supra note 104, at 2473 ("In some instances, full gay equality would be a fundamental
affront to liberty interests of religious or traditionalist groups, in ways that full gender or race equality
no longer are. In such instances, accommodation is both likely and appropriate, from a gaylegal as well
as religious point of view.").
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